I’d like to begin with a simple quotation, from a proclamation issued to the people of Baghdad: ‘Our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors, but as liberators’. These words were spoken eighty-nine years ago by the British commander Lieutenant General Stanley Maude on the occasion of the military occupation of Baghdad in March 1917. They were mirrored almost exactly by the speech addressed to British troops on the eve of the current invasion three years ago by Lieutenant Colonel Tim Collins, who said: ‘We go to liberate, not to conquer’. Of course, the mirroring of these two stories doesn’t end there. Within three years of General Maude’s proclamation, 10,000 had died in an Iraqi uprising against the British rulers, who gassed and bombed the insurgents. It was likewise entirely predictable in our own time that a new military occupation of Iraq would face determined guerrilla resistance long after Saddam Hussein had gone. Incidentally, in 2003 the British military headquarters in Baghdad’s Green Zone was named ‘Maude House’.

‘History’ is important not just because it casts the current geopolitical catastrophe of the Middle East and Central Asia into a necessary longer context of colonialism, military pacification, improvised state formation, and nationalist insurgency – ‘history’ is important not just because of those necessary reminders, but also because the architects of current US and British policies in the region constantly call on history in explanation of their decision to invade. I’m thinking here not so much of the debased rhetorical comparisons of Saddam Hussein with Hitler and of his dictatorship with that of the Third Reich, or of the associated loose analogies with the processes of economic and political reconstruction in Europe after the Second World War. I’d like to focus instead on the larger historical rationales that are now moving the two principal and partially competing visions of a ‘new world order’ that underpin the current US and British presence in the Middle East.

The first of these is the more ‘liberal’ version espoused by the British government under Tony Blair, which has drawn a wider chorus of voices in its support, from mavericks like Christopher Hitchens to human-rights commentators like Michael Ignatieff and a wider equivocating and ambivalent network of public intellectuals who accepted the liberal rationale.
for a policy of regime change but couldn’t quite bring themselves to line up behind the Bush administration. In the common language of its advocates, this standpoint is ‘a new internationalism’ or a ‘new doctrine of humanitarian intervention’, what Blair called in February 2003 a necessary redefinition ‘of centre-left politics to cope with a more insecure world’.2 This view postulates a co-operative international system. Among practitioners, one of its most influential advocates is the British diplomat Robert Cooper (currently Director-General for External and Politico-Military Affairs at the EU), who laid it out in an essay called ‘The Post-Modern State’ in a volume published in 2002 by the Foreign Policy Centre.3 These arguments are predicated on a large historical claim about the distinctive international order created by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War; they are linked to concepts of ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’ states; they redeploy liberal-imperialist arguments about the civilizing mission; and they urge the advanced states like the US and putatively the EU to step up to the plate and accept ‘their responsibilities in the world’. Here are the concluding paragraphs:

The post-modern EU offers a vision of cooperative empire, a common liberty and a common security without the ethnic domination and centralised absolutism to which past empires have been subject, but also without the ethnic exclusiveness that is the hallmark of the nation state – inappropriate in an era without borders and unworkable in regions such as the Balkans. A cooperative empire might be the domestic political framework that best matches the altered substance of the post-modern state: a framework in which each has a share in the government, in which no single country dominates and in which the governing principles are not ethnic but legal. The lightest of touches will be required from the center; the ‘imperial bureaucracy’ must be under control, accountable, and the servant, not the master, of the commonwealth. Such an institution must be as dedicated to liberty and democracy as its constituent parts. Like Rome, this commonwealth would provide its citizens with some of its laws, some coins and the occasional road. That perhaps is the vision. Can it be realized? Only time will tell. The question is how much time there may be. In the modern world the secret race to acquire nuclear weapons goes on. In the premodern world the interests of organised crime – including international terrorism – grow greater and faster than the state. There may not be much time left.4

Of course the second vision of a new world order is the one mainly motivating the current administration in the United States. Explicitly inspired by the new global circumstances of the end of the Cold War, its advocates have been postulating from the very beginning a unique field of opportunity for the United States as the sole remaining superpower, which in their view it would be fundamentally irresponsible to forego.
In contrast to the Blair version, this second approach has been avowedly unilateralist from the outset, extending from the non-ratification of the Kyoto accords, through the opposition to the International Criminal Court and the withdrawal from international agreements about nuclear arms, to the general disregard for the United Nations. In one of the main statements of the new approach, the 2002 National Security Strategy report rejected older policies of deterrence, containment, and collective security, opting instead for the principles of offensive military intervention, pre-emptive first strikes, and proactive counter-proliferation measures against rogue states and other enemies. As George W. Bush stated in his introduction to this strategy document: 'The only path to peace and security is the path of action'. This new grand design was presaged in the Defence Policy Guidance document written in 1992 by Paul Wolfowitz (who was to become Deputy Secretary of Defense) and I. Lewis Libby (who was to become Vice-President Cheney's chief of staff); and it was laid out in great detail in the Report on Rebuilding America's Defences: Strategy, Forces, and Resources for a New Century issued by the Project for a New American Century (PNAC) in advance of the Presidential elections in 2000.

The authors of that report, whose signatories included Wolfowitz, Libby, Cheney, Rumsfeld, Richard Perle, Zalmay Khalilzad, and Jeb Bush, explicitly committed themselves to US mastery of the globe for the coming age. They spoke of 'full spectrum dominance', meaning American invincibility in every field of warfare – land, sea, air, and space – and a world in which no two nations' relationship with each other will be more important than their relationship with the US. There should be no place on earth, or the heavens for that matter, where Washington's writ does not run supreme. To that end, a ring of US military bases should surround China, with containment of the People’s Republic as the proximate goal and its liberation the ultimate prize.

What do we make of this body of thought? I have two broad comments in this regard. One is simply to mark the powerful continuity between this pre-2000 policy discussion and what the Bush administration has actually done. This overall coherence of the programmatic discourse emanating from the dense constellation of policy institutes, think tanks, research foundations, advisory committees, lobbying networks, journals, and other organs of opinion ringing the Bush administration should never be underestimated. Moreover, whatever the relationship might be to big oil and other corporate interests or to the new techno-military complex of defence industries in the privatized contract economy, it is far less important than the larger strategic vision binding all of this together. In this Eldorado dream-world of full-scale global integration, the post-Cold War hubris of wanting to be the benign hegemon works harmoniously with the dogma of untrammeled free-market capitalism and the rhetoric of expanding democracy. The geopolitical remaking of the entire Middle Eastern and Central Asian world-region is in this context crucial not only in its immediate terms,
but also for the longer-term purposes of the containment of China. Responding to Brent Scowcroft’s warnings that a war against Iraq might ‘turn the whole region into a cauldron’, Michael Ledeen countered in August 2002 that:

One can only hope that we turn the region into a cauldron, and faster, please. If ever there were a region that richly deserved being cauldronized, it is the Middle East today. If we wage the war effectively, we will bring down the terror regimes in Iraq, Iran, and Syria, and either bring down the Saudi monarchy or force it to abandon its global assembly line to indoctrinate young terrorists. That’s our mission in the war against terror.9

‘Change toward democratic regimes in Tehran and Baghdad would unleash a tsunami across the Islamic world’, claimed Joshua Muravchik in that same month.10 On 4 September 2002 Ledeen called for the US to launch ‘a vast democratic revolution to liberate all the peoples of the Middle East. . . . It is impossible to imagine that the Iranian people would tolerate tyranny in their own country once freedom had come to Iraq. Syria would follow in short order’.11 Or, as one enthusiast for Rebuilding America’s Defences put it concisely: ‘After Baghdad, Beijing’.12

The second point here is that we can only grasp the import of globalization if we see it as unfolding inside one kind of political framework or another.13 The current languages and processes of ‘globalization’ make no sense outside of their varying and specific relations to a variety of possible political projects, whose coherence and genealogies need to be carefully reconstructed. Among radical or progressive commentators during the past decade or so, for example, there have been all sorts of diverse reactions to globalization claims. Some of these are avowedly ‘for’ or ‘against’ the latter, in the sense of either endorsing or resisting the normativities of the ‘new global order’. Others take ‘globality’ as the increasingly universal ground, the now-given or ‘objective’ historical circumstances, from which political thinking and action now have to begin. In the camp of the more abstractly affirmative defenders of globalization as a new master concept we might mention Anthony Giddens, Zygmunt Bauman, Ulrich Beck, and David Held. To them can be added the sociologists of particular ‘globalizing’ phenomena like migration, diasporas, ‘global cities’, borderlands, transnational social movements and forms of politics, cross-border networks and regions, new electronic media and their consequences, and the vaunted emergence of a ‘global civil society’. Qualified critics of the excessive neoliberalism of globalization in its current form, and the advocates of greater degrees of international regulation, include Joseph Stiglitz and George Soros. Among globalization’s more fundamental root-and-branch critics we can separate those like David Harvey who accept its demonstrated actuality from those who remain sceptical in principle about the novelties involved,
such as Immanuel Wallerstein or Fred Cooper. Beyond them all lies the spectrum of downright adversarial rejectionism associated with parts of the anti-globalization movement.  

Here it’s worth distinguishing between globalization as a category of ordinary language, or a descriptive term in ‘plain speech’, and globalization as a category of analysis, which aims to capture the specificities of change in the actually existing worlds of capitalism and its social formations at the turn of the twenty-first century. Another way of putting this would be to distinguish between the late twentieth-century intellectual histories which shaped this particular way of conceptualizing contemporary change, and on the other hand the actual histories – economically, sociologically, culturally, institutionally, politically – to which it brings both coherence and further impetus. In that sense, ‘globalization’ is both symptom (as the language generated around a particular set of powerful contemporary histories) and diagnosis (as the processes requiring description). Contemporary change both constructs globalization talk and is further constructed by it.

Thus we are dealing with that familiar dialectical reciprocity between on the one hand the purchase of a particular language of social understanding as it circulates through the public sphere and on the other hand the actually existing phenomena, events, and transformations which that language purports to describe and explain. That is to say, ‘globalization’ as a socio-economic, cultural, and political postulate (as a set of powerful and insistent claims about changes in the really existing world) is just as crucial to the process of globalization as the existence of globalization as a demonstrable social fact (the supposed structural primacy of global integration). The ideology or the discourse of globalization is arguably a better starting point for analysis than either economics or sociology in the more structural or materialist sense, because it’s at this discursive level that the operative purchase of globalization on public understanding has been constituted and secured, including the terms under which particular ideas and policies can be admitted into its frame and the issue of who gets to speak in its languages, who gets to set the dominant tone. By the ‘ideology or discourse of globalization’ I mean both the insistence on globalization as the organizing reality of the emerging international order and the crystallizing of specific practices, policies, and institutions around that insistence. In other words, the history of globalization has become inseparable from the history of the category. Globalization has emerged during the past ten-fifteen years as a set of discursive claims about the international world seeking aggressively to reorder that world in terms of itself.

LOCATING THE DIFFERENCE OF THE PRESENT

This is basically what I mean by ‘historicizing the global’. Of course, I’m well aware that among many of its critics ‘globalization’ remains
a highly disputed term, not least because of its annoying lack of historical specificity and frequently inflated claims about the radical novelty of the present. Thus for critics like Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson the world economy is far less completely integrated today than true-believing globalists would like us to think and indeed by some measures falls well behind the degree of integration evident before 1914. By some key indicators the scale and pace of change between the 1890s and 1914 were strikingly more impressive – as measured, for example, by the degree of integration of world capital markets, by the interdependence of national and regional economies, by the expansion of international trade, and by the scale of transnational and intercontinental labour migrations. Other sceptics make the argument of ‘Nothing New Under the Sun’. There’s been no shortage of voices among historians of colonialism, of slavery, of capitalism’s creation of the world economy, and of the rest’s subjection to the West, among whom Fred Cooper is one of the most persuasive, who argue that globalism as such has been a fact of life for a very long time. Thus recent international actions, with their confusing mélange of self-interested, altruistic, and aggrandizing rationalizations, come as no surprise to historians of decolonization, of the high imperialism before 1914, of the nineteenth-century civilizing mission, or of 1492. Marxists have also long been familiar with global capital flows and their far-reaching social and political effects, which free the capacity for progress only in the most contradictory and rebarbative of ways. In other words, this chorus of critics avers, if we are all global now we also need far more precise languages of analysis to clarify what exactly that condition might mean. We need some better means of specifying the originality of the present.

Fred Cooper in particular pours withering scepticism on ‘globalization’ as a useful category of analysis. If we concede the longevity and depth of the processes involved and take globalization to mean ‘the progressive integration of different parts of the world into a singular whole’ going back to the fifteenth century, he insists, then ‘the argument falls victim to linearity and teleology’. If we take the opposite tack by arguing that ‘the global age is now’ and sharply separate it from any deeper historical past, then it remains far from clear how the concept of ‘the global’ can be capable of distinguishing the present from earlier periods in that sense. ‘Communications revolutions, capital movements, and regulatory apparatuses all need to be studied and their relationships, mutually reinforcing or contradictory, explored’, but the language of ‘globalization’ only oversimplifies the tasks of analyzing ‘the variety and specificity of cross-territorial connecting mechanisms in past and present’. In Cooper’s view, for example, ‘From the sixteenth-century slave trade through the nineteenth-century period of imperialism in the name of emancipation, the interrelation of different parts of the world was essential to the histories of each part of it. But the mechanisms of interrelation were contingent and limited in their transformative capacity – as they still are’. But if that earlier
‘Atlantic system’ wasn’t systemic enough to be called ‘an eighteenth-century “globalization”’, then nor in its own ways is the early twenty-first-century present. Each needs a more exactly constructed analytical term than the simplifying rhetorics of ‘globalization’ can provide. What we need, Cooper argues, is ‘precision in specifying how such commodity circuits are constituted, how connections across space are extended and bounded, and how large-scale, long-term processes, such as capitalist development, can be analyzed with due attention to their power, their limitations, and the mechanisms that shape them’.18

If much of the current talk of globalization lacks specificity of ‘depth’ in Cooper’s sense, then it also flattens out globalization’s geographical unevenness. The most facile versions of such talk accept the programmatic advocacy of global integration straightforwardly on its own terms. On the one hand, they flatly presume neoliberalism’s ‘powerful cultural and economic ideology of the world market as naturally operating within neoliberal terms, which will try to enforce one world with one cultural framework of reference, one pattern of consumption, without significant cultural differences’.19 Such versions presume an overriding single logic to the contemporary functioning of the world economy, to which no viable alternative may be posed. To the degree that particular states, regions, or economies drop out of the frame, they become emptied of significance as ‘failed’ or ‘collapsed’ cases. On the other hand, these versions efface the political centrality for the ascendant market order of an elaborate and normally coercive complex of regulative international interventions. Those interventions can sometimes be financial, as in the Mexican default of 1982–84 and the many other national debt crises of the 1980s, which finally ushered in the crucial IMF shift from a broadly Keynesian frame of thinking to the monetarist orthodoxies of ‘structural adjustment’; they can sometimes be institutional, as most obviously in the creation of the new regulative complex of North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) since 1994–95; they can sometimes be diplomatic; and if necessary they can certainly be military.20 Particularly for weaker or thinly specialized economies without any viable niche in the world market, this political machinery of globalization tends to produce destructive and subordinated lines of connectedness to the world economy whose chronically selective, segmented, and exclusionary forms militate specifically against those types of organized social solidarity and societal cohesion that a well-functioning polity normally requires.

This is disastrously true for most of Africa, where any ‘global’ links occur predominantly ‘in a selective, discontinuous, and point-to-point fashion’.21 Whether in relation to capital flows or the increasingly salient political agency of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), each of which in effect transnationalizes the bases for policy-making in sub-Saharan Africa, accountability in conventional political terms has all but dissolved. In James Ferguson’s words, those networks ‘hop over (rather than flowing
through) the territories inhabited by the vast majorities of the African population’, who thereby acquire ‘only a tenuous and indirect connection’ to any wider global economy. In other words, globalization as an actual set of processes affecting the world (as against the idealized claims of the globalizing grand narrative) necessarily presumes and produces, in fact specifically feeds off, dynamics of destabilizing and destructive unevenness and inequality. From an African standpoint, as Ferguson puts it, globalization is not a seamless, shiny, round, and all-encompassing totality (as the word seems to imply). Nor is it a higher level of planetary unity, interconnection, and communication. Rather, the ‘global’ we see in recent studies of Africa has sharp, jagged edges; rich and dangerous traffic amid zones of generalized abjection; razor-wired enclaves next to abandoned hinterlands. It features entire countries with estimated life expectancies in the mid-thirties and dropping; warfare seemingly without end; and the steepest economic inequalities seen in human history to date. It is a global where capital flows and markets are at once lightning fast and patchy and incomplete; where the globally networked enclave sits right beside the ungovernable humanitarian disaster zone. It is a global not of planetary communion, but of disconnection, segmentation, and segregation — not a seamless world without borders, but a patchwork of discontinuous and hierarchically ranked spaces, whose edges are carefully delimited, guarded, and enforced.

Given these various kinds of well-grounded scepticism, how then should we approach the extremely large-scale claims advanced by globalization talk? How should we render the concept usable? I’ll develop my own rough-and-ready response to this conundrum in four areas of definition, each of which rests on a particular historicizing argument.

THE DIN OF GLOBALIZATION

My first move is simply to register the inescapable discursive noise of globalization. The quickest way of making this point is to find a particularly vociferous loudmouth, and my choice here would be Thomas L. Friedman: best-selling, Pulitzer Prize-winning, Op-Ed columnist for the New York Times, and author of The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding Globalization. Of course, as an analytical term ‘globalization’ has far more extensive genealogies going back mainly to the early 1990s and with a finer-tuned origin between the 1960s and early 1980s, but there can be no question that Friedman launched the term into more general public currency. ‘The driving idea behind globalization’, he said in ‘A Manifesto for a Fast World’, published in the New York Times Magazine in March 1999 to accompany his book, ‘is free-market capitalism’. His brash and fervent
advocacy was organized around three axioms. To begin with, globalization provides the overriding and inescapable main logic of development and prosperity of the present: ‘The more you let market forces rule and the more you open your economy to free trade and competition, the more flourishing and efficient your economy will be. Globalization means the spread of free-market capitalism to virtually every country in the world.’

Next, the present of globalization was produced by the world-historical defeat of socialism and the new vistas opened by the end of the Cold War: ‘Unlike the cold-war system, which was largely static, globalization involves the integration of free markets, nation-states and information technologies to a degree never before witnessed, in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations and countries to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever. It is also producing a powerful backlash from those brutalized or left behind’.

Precisely because of that backlash, finally, this ‘emerging global order’ requires ruthless political guarantees: quite aside from the underlying discipline of market efficiencies, the new ‘globalization system’ needs militarized protection. Or, as Friedman puts it: if ‘the [new] supermarkets can destroy you by downgrading your bonds’, then ‘the United States can destroy you by dropping bombs’. He continues:

That is why sustainable globalization still requires a stable geopolitical power structure, which simply cannot be maintained without the active involvement of the United States. All the technologies that Silicon Valley is designing to carry digital voices, videos and data around the world, all the trade and financial integration it is promoting through its innovations and the wealth this is generating, are happening in a world stabilized by a benign superpower, with its capital in Washington, D.C.

In Friedman’s thinking economics, politics, and culture all work powerfully together: ‘In most countries, people can no longer distinguish between American power, American exports, American cultural assaults, American cultural exports, and plain old globalization’. But the military guarantee is seen to be crucial: ‘The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist – McDonald’s can never flourish without McDonnell Douglas, the builder of the F-15. And the hidden fist that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley’s technologies is called the United States Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps’. In the words of his concluding sentence: ‘Without America on duty, there will be no America Online’.

The point I want to make here is very straightforward: in a public environment defined so pervasively and aggressively – so noisily – by globalization talk of this kind, in which the talk is so completely embedded in an expanding repertoire of process and policy, it becomes naïve and ineffectual to continue insisting primarily on the historical imprecisions
of the term itself. Something is happening here, and as a matter of intellectual and political urgency we need to focus on trying to capture what that is.

HISTORIES OF CAPITALISM

Secondly, I’d like to propose my own grand periodization as a necessary framework for allowing the distinctiveness of the present to emerge; and this is where I’m most sympathetic to the critique Fred Cooper lays out. Here I hope to be forgiven for polishing a small nugget of Marxist incorrigibility, because it’s not hard to interpret the primary logics of globalization in Friedman’s rendition as a belated vindication of the predictions of *The Communist Manifesto* and even as a kind of vulgar paraphrase. For at the very time Marxist thought was being so effectively consigned to the dumpster, the forms of capitalist power in the world were coming closer than ever to vindicating a powerful feature of classical Marxist critique. If Marxist critiques have been more or less driven from the public field, the celebratory tones of pro-market advocacy ironically confirm a key set of Marxist claims. The well-nigh universal triumph of market principles – not just as a system of ideas for describing an untrammelled capitalist economy, but as a set of precepts for all areas of public policy and social life – have become the fundament for a brutally frank materialist theory of politics based on the movement of the economy. Indeed, our remarkable contemporary conjuncture, in which the public values, dominant ideas, and range of accessible politics are all thought to be tied so consistently to an overriding logic of capital accumulation and the ruling dictates of the economy, seems eerily reminiscent of the triumph of capitalism on a world scale imagined by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in *The Communist Manifesto*, first published in 1848.

As it happens, in its 1996 *World Development Report*, entitled *From Plan to Market*, the World Bank summarized the transition of the former socialist countries to a ‘market orientation’ in precisely these terms, describing the momentousness of the changes of the 1990s by invoking the *Manifesto’s* famous phrase of ‘all that is solid melts into air’. Indeed, this image of the victorious free-market order establishing itself on a genuinely global scale, dissolving all the forms of anti-capitalist recalcitrance and sweeping away the impediments to expansion, has become an extraordinarily apposite one for the early twenty-first century. As Eric Hobsbawm observed in his ‘Modern Edition’ of the *Manifesto* for its 150th anniversary, Marx and Engels offered insights of ‘startling contemporary relevance’, including:

- the recognition of capitalism as a world system capable of marshalling production on a global scale; its devastating impact on all aspects of
human existence, work, the family, and the distribution of wealth; and the understanding that, far from being a stable, immutable system, it is, on the contrary, susceptible to enormous convulsions and crisis...\textsuperscript{34}

Events that at one level are taken to have refuted Marxism’s validity as a theory of the direction of history – Communism’s ending, the collapse of viable alternatives to capitalism, the obstacles to a politics centred around class – at another level precisely instantiate Marxism’s analysis of the dynamism of capitalist accumulation. Similarly, neoliberal thinking has now made the possibilities for democracy so strictly dependent on a particular conception of the economy as to put the most vulgar of all vulgar Marxists to shame. The space for any realistic or accessible politics – meaningful actions of government in society – is strictly demarcated in this way of thinking by the needs of the economy conceived in terms of the market.

This is how I’d like to begin elaborating my grand-scale periodization, namely, by structuring it around the histories of the development of capitalism and its distinctive social formations as we encounter them on a global scale. But I’d like to build that framework not around the classical understanding of industrialization and the Industrial Revolution to which we normally repair, nor around that deeper set of arguments about the passage from feudalism to capitalism we associate with the so-called ‘transition debates’ of the 1950s and 1970s, but by bringing two other bodies of contemporary thought into play.\textsuperscript{35} One of these comprises the increasingly rich historiographies of slavery, post-emancipation societies, and the Black Atlantic, which continue to challenge us into rethinking our basic notations of the origins of the modern world. The other draws on what we know about the distinctive conditions of accumulation and exploitation now defining the new globalized division of labour of the present, particularly with respect to the deregulated migrant and transnationalized labour markets currently being generated at an ever-accelerating pace. Using the latter, I want to point out some contrasts with the previous accumulation regime established after 1945 and lasting until the fresh changes of the mid 1970s.

In that way I’d like to suggest an argument about those histories of capitalism on a world scale that both precede and postdate the more specific histories of industrial manufacturing by which the rise of capitalism has commonly been defined. So far, interestingly, much of the ‘Black Atlantic’ argument has tended to be formulated around questions of citizenship and personhood focused by the impact of the French Revolution, most classically with respect to the Haitian Revolution and the wider insurrectionary radicalisms and aspirations to freedom in the Caribbean, rather than around the modernity of capitalism as such.\textsuperscript{36} There’s perhaps a way in which the big turning away from social history to cultural history has occluded our ability to see this primary form of ‘the social’ very
confidently any more or even to write at all about the origins of capitalism in the earlier manner of the 1960s and 1970s. In the very best of the new work on the societal transformations accompanying the end of New World slavery, for example, emphasis tends to be placed on the countervailing logic of the effort at securing the generalized norm of the free labour contract, which worked inexorably against the longed-for ideals of civic liberty and emancipated personhood. The conceptual focus tends to be on the securing of the new relations required by the capitalist labour contract, even as elaborate machineries for the recruitment and deployment of indentured and ‘semi-free’ labour power continued to persist, so that the promised meanings of freedom and citizenship, which were in any case vitally conditioned by race and labour during the transition out of slavery, necessarily became compromised. But the already formed place of slavery itself in a capitalist system of production tends not to be brought quite as easily into thought. Its notation as an essentially pre-capitalist formation, or at best an anomaly once ‘the wage labor-driven capitalist system [began] maturing on a global scale’, remains tacitly intact.37

But what’s becoming increasingly clear from the monographic work on slave economies of the Caribbean, as well as from Robin Blackburn’s magnum opus The Making of New World Slavery and the oeuvre of Sidney Mintz, is that we should properly regard slavery not as representing some archaic or pre-capitalist social formation or occupying some anomalous relationship to the rise of capitalism as such, but on the contrary as producing the first modern proletariat of large-scale, highly organized, and integrated capitalist production.38 Thinking of the New World plantation economies in relation to capitalist regimes of production, exploitation, and accumulation in this way vitally destabilizes our more familiar teleologies of capitalist industrialization. It resituates our understanding of working-class formation in a set of social relations that both preceded and starkly differed from those normally attributed to capitalist industry. Organized on the most global of scales, the labour regime in question continued to overlap and coexist with the latter well into the epoch of the Industrial Revolution classically understood. To the modernity of the enslaved mass worker, moreover, we may further add the analogous importance of domestic servitude for the overall labour markets and regimes of accumulation prevailing inside the eighteenth-century Anglo-Scottish national economy at home.39 If we then put these two social regimes of labour together, that of the enslaved mass worker of the New World and that of the servile labourers of the households, workshops, and farms of the Old, then we have the makings of a radically different account of the dynamics of the rise of capitalism and the modes of social subordination that allowed it to occur. In the most basic of social-historical terms, for example, servants in their many guises formed one of the very largest and most essential working categories of the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (that is, precisely in the core period of
industrialization), yet seldom figure anywhere in the established accounts of either the capitalist economy or working-class formation. So if we take seriously on board this centrality of non-industrial work and the fundamental importance of service, domestic labour, and everything that’s accomplished in households, while adding it to the driving importance of enslaved mass production, then our conventional understanding of the histories of political economy and working-class formation will surely have to change.40

A further implication arises once we shoot our vision forward over the longest term of capitalism’s history since the eighteenth century to return to our question about the distinctiveness of its forms in the present. Once we revise our understanding of the early histories of capital accumulation by acknowledging the generative contributions of slavery and servitude, in fact, we have already begun questioning the presumed centrality of waged work in manufacturing, extractive and other forms of modern industry for the overall narrative of the rise of capitalism. By shifting the perspective in that way, we effectively relativize wage labour’s place in the social histories of working-class formation and open our accounts of the latter to other regimes of labour. By that logic, the claim of waged work to analytical precedence in the developmental histories of capitalism no longer seems secure. As it happens, in fact, the de-skilling, de-unionizing, de-benefiting, and de-nationalizing of labour via the processes of metropolitan deindustrialization and transnationalized capitalist restructuring in our own time have also been undermining that claim from the opposite end of the chronology, namely from a vantage-point in the present. Today the social relations of work are being drastically transformed in the direction of the new low-wage, semi-legal, and deregulated labour markets of a mainly service-based economy increasingly organized in complex transnational ways. In light of that radical reproletarianizing of labour under today’s advanced capitalism, I want to argue, the preceding prevalence of socially valued forms of organized labour established after 1945, which postwar social democrats hoped so confidently could become normative, re-emerges as an extremely transitory phenomenon. The life of that recently defeated redistributive social-democratic vision of the humanizing of capitalism becomes revealed as an extremely finite and exceptional project, indeed as one that was mainly confined to the period between the postwar settlement after 1945 and its long and painful dismantling after the mid 1970s.

In light of that contemporary reproletarianizing of labour, perhaps we should even see the period in which labour became both collectively organized and socially valued via trade unions, public policy, wider common sense, and the acceptable ethics of a society’s shared collective life as merely a brief blip in the history of capitalist social formations whose ordering principles have otherwise been quite differently institutionalized and understood, whether at the beginning (in the eighteenth century) or
at the end (now). As I’ve just suggested, the blip in question may be located historically inside Eric Hobsbawm’s ‘golden age’ of the unprecedented post-1945 capitalist boom whose forms of socio-political democratization (through planning, full employment, social services, redistributive taxation, recognition for trade unions, public schooling, collectivist ideals of social improvement, a general ethic of public goods) were brought steadily under brutally effective political attack after the mid 1970s. At most, one might argue, the labour movement’s rise and political validation may be dated to the first three quarters of the twentieth century, varying markedly from country to country.

There are two features of this argument that deserve extra clarification. First, the suggestion that both slaves and servants be considered categories of workers may seem to depart so radically from the normal practice of defining the ‘working class’ by the wage relationship as to be needlessly confusing. Yet, as I’ve tried to argue, once related to the history of capitalism overall, the classic wage-earning proletariat actually re-emerges as a relatively transitory and sectorally specific formation produced in quite delimited historical periods and circumstances. Moreover, under any particular capitalism wage labour has in any case always continued to coexist with various types of unfree and coercive labour. The salience of such simultaneities – of the temporal coexistence inside a particular capitalist social formation of forced, indentured, enslaved, and unfree forms of work with the free wage relationship strictly understood – needs to be carefully acknowledged. Such simultaneities become all the more salient once we begin conceptualizing capital accumulation on a properly global scale by integrating the forms of surplus extraction occurring in the colonial, neocolonial, or underdeveloped worlds. The West’s privileged prosperity, including precisely the possibility of the social-democratic improvements associated with the three decades after 1945, has been founded, constitutively, on horrendous repertoires of extraction and exploitation on such a world scale. Other forms of labour coercion have likewise been characteristic of even the most advanced capitalist economies in their time, as for instance during the two World Wars, or under the racialized New Order of the Third Reich. In these terms, I’d argue, the search for a ‘pure’ working-class formation, from which forms of enslavement, servitude, indenturing, impressment, conscription, imprisonment, and coercion have been purged, remains a chimera. Once we define working-class formation not by the creation of the wage relationship in the strict sense alone, therefore, but by labour’s contributions to the wider variety of accumulation regimes we can encounter in the histories of capitalism between the eighteenth century and now, we can see the multiplicity of possible labour regimes more easily too.

Secondly, I’m suggesting neither a ‘cyclical’ history of labour, through which the forms of labour exploitation in the twenty-first century somehow loop back or revert to the forms prevalent in the early phases of capitalism,
nor an equivalency between today’s ‘deskill’d or ‘reproletarianized’
labourers and eighteenth-century servants and slaves. Rather, by focusing
on those two largest categories of labourers during the earliest processes
of accumulation, we’re able to see the extremely varied labour regimes that
sustained those processes, including those based on coercion. In some
ways this argument has affinities with earlier critiques of the classical
narratives of the Industrial Revolution, which emphasized instead proto-
industrialization, small-scale rural industry, new forms of non-industrial
manufacturing, and the wide range of ‘alternatives to mass production’.

Clearly we need to hold on to the necessary distinctions between forms of
‘free’ and ‘coercive’ labour, because otherwise certain specificities of the
labour contract under industrial capitalism would become much harder
to see, particularly those that require new domains of power and
exploitation beyond the immediate labour process and the workplace itself.

To summarize what I’ve just been saying: on the one hand, there are
strong grounds for seeing servitude and slavery as the social forms of labour
that were foundational to the capitalist modernity forged during the
eighteenth century; and on the other hand, there is equally compelling
evidence since the late twentieth century of the shaping of a new and
radically stripped-down version of the labour contract. These new forms
of the exploitation of labour have been accumulating around the growing
prevalence of minimum-wage, dequalified and deskilled, disorganized and
deregulated, semi-legal and migrant labour markets, in which workers are
systemically stripped of most forms of security and organized protections.

This is what is characteristic for the circulation of labour power in
the globalized and post-Fordist economies of the late capitalist world,
and this is where we should begin the task of specifying the distinctiveness
of the present. Whether from the standpoint of the ‘future’ of capitalism
or from the standpoint of its ‘origins’, the more classical understanding of
capitalism and its social formations as being centred around industrial
production in manufacturing begins to seem like an incredibly partial
and potentially distortive one, a phase to be found overwhelmingly in
the West, in ways that presupposed precisely its absence from the rest of
the world and lasted for a remarkably brief slice of historical time.

DEMISE OF ANTI-IMPERIALIST SOVEREIGNTY

Thirdly, there is a further dimension to the periodization I’ve been
suggesting. If the social-democratic architects of the post-1945 settlement
in western Europe mistook its transitory and exceptional circumstances
of regulated capitalism, collectivist social policy and redistributive
betterment for a permanent reality, for a kind of permanently unfolding
present, one which however actually started to fall apart in the new
conjuncture after 1968–73, then the heft for that postwar system of
politics had also depended on the pressures exerted by the Cold War.
From the strategic thinking behind the Marshall Plan through the logics of trade-union corporatism and the building of the postwar welfare states to the general social policy regimes of the 1950s and 1960s, the desire to solidify a broad societal consensus against the ‘Second World’ of socialism was absolutely crucial. Here there are two key dimensions, one concerning the advanced capitalist West, the other involving the former Third World, each of which bears directly on how we might think about our globalized present. Thus there can be little doubt, to take the first of these dimensions, that the collapse of the Soviet Union removed a vital constraint previously shaping the political cultures of the capitalist West. Quite aside from the West’s interior dynamics of deindustrialization and capitalist restructuring after the 1970s and their consequences for politics, the public discourse surrounding the end of Communism in 1989–91 decisively damaged the future plausibility of socialist ideas. Of course, both the crimes of Stalinism and the manifold exhaustion of Soviet-style planning had long undermined socialism’s available legitimacy, severely compromising the ground from which socialist ideas might be argued for between the 1950s and the 1980s. But however manifestly ‘actually existing socialism’ had already been discredited, the ultimate denouement painfully compounded the difficulty. At the very least, the possible forms of socialist advocacy became marginalized and constrained. More commonly, such space became all but closed down.44

But the long-running analogue to this in the former Third World has been the disappointments and steady exhaustion of the progressive nationalist aspiration towards ‘development in one country’ and welfare populism that once provided the main scaffolding for the politics of independence after decolonization. This is what Samir Amin and others have called the Bandung Era, during which the combined project of national developmentalism, anti-imperialist sovereignty, and international non-alignment became focused after the Bandung Conference of April 1955 around regimes like Nehru’s India, Nasser’s Egypt, Sukarno’s Indonesia, and Nkrumah’s Ghana.45 That intense valorizing of anti-imperialist sovereignty around rhetorics of ‘economic independence, popular power, social justice, and cultural dignity’ then acquired further momentum from projects like Salvador Allende’s Chile, Julius Nyerere’s Tanzania, and Michael Manley’s Jamaica. The coalescence of left-nationalist aspirations around the socio-political project of decolonization received continuing impetus from the successful liberation of the Portuguese colonies, from the defeat of the United States in South-East Asia, and from radical nationalist departures reaching from the Horn of Africa to Afghanistan. Left-nationalist projects of one kind or another attained considerable purchase on both popular and intellectual imaginations until they gradually and unevenly collapsed beneath the conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s.46

In the course of the resulting turmoils, a decisive international realignment became engineered for which the World Bank’s
‘structural adjustment’ programmes came to supply the new principles of
global reordering. In this extra-European global context, too, preceding the
collapse of the Soviet Union, the persuasiveness and workability of socialist
ideas encountered drastic defeats. Again, given the extent of the latter,
it’s hard any longer to reconstruct the discursive space still adumbrated
during the 1970s by a politics of ‘feasible socialism’.47 But in precisely that
sense the socialist part of the world had functioned as a very important
ideological resource for the emergent societies of the Third World, not so
much as practical models of social administration and the planned economy,
let alone as any concretely realized utopia, but rather as a potential space
of non-capitalist experimentation. That space of alternative potentials,
however unappealing and compromised under Stalinism, at least allowed
liberalism’s bid for the one universal and necessary path of history to
be contested. Since the end of Communism, that horizon of alternative
thinking has effectively disappeared. Following Arno J. Mayer’s classic
framework of ‘Wilson versus Lenin’ proposed over forty years ago, we might
argue that the Bolshevik Revolution opened a distinct period of world
history extending from 1917 to 1991, at the close of which the global option
of a nationally conceived anti-imperialist sovereignty had been finally
cancelled from the agenda. It was removed from the colonial, neo-colonial,
and post-colonial non-Western world by a complex convergence of many
histories. But the most brutally determinative remains the neoliberal
triumphalism made possible by the collapse of the Soviet Union.48

HOW IS THE PRESENT GLOBALIZED?

Fourthly, what are the senses in which our own present may be usefully said
to have become ‘globalized’? Here I should say that I find the concept
of a post-Fordist transition the best means of starting to theorize the
contemporary process of capitalist restructuring since the 1970s in a
historically grounded way.49 While making due allowance for the patent
prefigurings and longer continuities stressed by Cooper or Hirst and
Thompson, I do also accept that the present has seen a qualitative
accelerating and intensifying of the world’s integration in three directions:
‘a marked reduction in the barriers between societies and states, an increasing
homogeneity of societies and states, and an increase in the volume of
interactions between societies – be this in terms of trade, capital, volumes
of currency traded or movements of tourists and migrants.’50 I can also
accept Anthony Giddens’s central argument that globalization rests on
a new problematic of ‘time-space differentiation’, which historically replaces
sociology’s ‘classical emphasis upon the analysis of [discretely demarcated
and sovereign] “societies” or “social systems”’.51 Under the logic of
globalization in Giddens’s view, an unprecedented dynamic of ‘time-space-
compression’ and ‘accelerating interdependence’ has produced both
a shrinkage of the world and the reordering of its earlier divisions
towards growing ‘interregional interconnectedness’, which then link the ‘intimate self’ to ‘social processes of a worldwide reach’ in dramatic new ways. In the words of one of Giddens’ principal followers, David Held, globalization signifies

a significant shift in the spatial reach of social action and organization towards the interregional or intercontinental scale. This does not mean that the global necessarily displaces or takes precedence over local, national or regional orders of social life. Rather the latter can become embedded within more expansive sets of interregional relations and networks of power. Thus, the constraints of social time and geographical space, vital coordinates of modern social life, no longer appear to impose fixed barriers to many forms of social interaction or organization, as the existence of the World Wide Web and round-the-clock trading in global financial markets attests. As distance ‘shrinks’, the relative speed of social interaction increases too, such that crises and events in distant parts of the globe...come to have an immediate worldwide impact involving diminishing response times for decision-makers. Globalization engenders a certain cognitive shift expressed in a growing public awareness of the ways in which distant events can affect local fortunes (and vice versa) as well as public perceptions of shrinking time and geographical space.

Held continues: ‘Simply put, globalization denotes the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up, and deepening impact of interregional flows and patterns of interaction. It refers to a shift or transformation in the scale of human organization that links distant communities and expands the reach of power relations across the world’s major regions and continents’.52

Beyond this more abstract systemic definition, there seem to me at least three key political effects needing especially to be singled out: first, the consequences for the organization of sovereignty within national states; second, the emergence of new forms of transnational or transregional social and political mobilization; and third, the profoundly ramified and volatile social, cultural, and political consequences of the new patterns of transnational migration, which have set millions of workers, asylum-seekers, and refugees into motion across the territorial borders of nationally conceived sovereign states.

Now, each of these topics would require a full-scale treatment of its own. Once we consider the issue of national state sovereignty, for instance, it’s certainly no simple matter to sort through the contending logics and counter-logics distinguished by the various schools in the discipline of international relations. On the one hand, there can be little dispute that in various ways and degrees the new modalities of supra-national governance are tending to compromise and reconfigure the earlier functions and
capacities of states as they became defined by an established national-territorial model of sovereignty. Linked to an inter-state system originating in the territorialized sovereignties ratified through the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, that model is usually held to have become broadly dominant in Europe and the Americas after the early nineteenth century, and elsewhere in the world since the early twentieth, with a kind of sustained culmination in Europe between the 1860s and the 1930s. For one major school of globalization thought, accordingly, the emergence of the distinctive late twentieth-century world order can then be defined as the end of that older so-called ‘Westphalian system’ of sovereign state actors. There is certainly a real process to be captured here. As Held recently put it:

In short, boundaries between states are of decreasing legal and moral significance. States are no longer regarded as discrete political worlds. International standards breach boundaries in numerous ways. Within Europe, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Union create new institutions and layers of law and governance which have divided political authority. Any assumption that sovereignty is an indivisible, illimitable, exclusive, and perpetual form of public power – entrenched within an individual state – is now defunct.53

But on the other hand, the radicalism of this supersession – and, even more, the degree of penetration of the new institutional arrangements into the social relations and everyday practices of those preconstituted nationally-bounded societies – has also been easily exaggerated. It is rather the evolving – and reversible – unevenness of this process, the complex balance of claims, jurisdictions, and capacities, that requires analysis. It is certainly possible to chart the duress, undermining, and systematic dismantlement of one historically particular form of the organization of territorialized sovereignty, namely the Keynesian national welfare state, which became normalized in north-western Europe between the later 1940s and late 1960s. But despite the latter’s patent demise and all the attendant reconfigurings of sovereignty, the established territorialized jurisdictions we associate with the national state have scarcely atrophied or disappeared in some overall, generalized, or final sense. Bob Jessop seems justified in affirming that ‘a restructured national state remains [nonetheless] central to the effective management of the emerging spatio-temporal matrices of capitalism and the emerging forms of post- or transnational citizenship’.54

BACK TO POLITICS AGAIN

Here I’d like to venture a few thoughts on globalization as a contested political project. My first point concerns the antinomy of
‘global governance’ versus ‘global civil society’, which are the two principal rubrics under which progressives have tried to conceptualize the issue of political control, the former being the signature of a Blairite, centrist programme of globalization, the latter being the attempt of some Left intellectuals to theorize the ground from which a democratic version of the new global order might be built up. In neither of these two respects, unfortunately, are the existing gains very compelling. If ‘global governance’ remains in complicated tension with older forms of nationally organized governmentality and political rule, then the much-vaunted emergence of ‘global civil society’ still remains inchoate, spasmodic, and malformed.55 Nonetheless, I’d argue that it’s in the field of possibility between these two programmatic descriptions of the politics of globalization that much of the important innovation of the coming ten years will tend to focus.56

However, as always when we’re dealing with binaries, there’s a third term already in play, because the primary political logic of globalization during the past decade has been one that powerfully *immunizes* the globalizing economy from either kind of political accountability, whether aggregated through forms of international coalition-building among progressive governments and guaranteed by a transnational legal order, or imagined via the limiting constraints imposed by the participatory activism of social movements. In contrast with either of these putative democratic imaginaries, as an economic theory neoliberalism specifically enshrines capital as the sovereign force in the organizing of society. The sole agencies neoliberalism recognizes for the purposes of the polity are the property-owning individual or corporation who are ‘free’ to engage in a competitive quest for improvement, and the market which is the regulator of that quest. In other words, the dominant neoliberal programme of globalization deliberately, aggressively, and dogmatically *brackets off* the economy from the sphere of available political choice. This is the second point I wish to make.

Third, there is one very specific political project of globalization, which has currently captured the leadership of the neoliberal drive, and that is the extremely ambitious geopolitical strategy of the Bush administration for a remaking of the global political order under the aegis of the United States as the sole hyperpower or hegemon. That strategy of course can be found in the programme laid out with tremendous conviction in the Report on *Rebuilding America’s Defences* issued by the PNAC and discussed at the start of this paper.

Against the implementation of that unilateralist programme, fourthly, it remains extremely unclear how an effective opposition might be mounted. As already suggested above, it’s certainly easy enough to exaggerate the degree to which economic globalization has been rendering the established framework of the nation-state obsolete. Even if the particular model of the Keynesian national welfare state may have been decisively undermined, there is still a great deal of latitude remaining for political action directed
through national state frameworks. That remains one possible ground from which checks on neoliberal globalization can occur. Moreover, under the aegis of the movement for global justice considerable creativity has developed around new types of transnational political mobilization. Those new forms of action – from NGOs and transborder advocacy networks to transnational citizens’ movements and the social-movement activism of Seattle and Genoa, together with the organized activity of the World Social Forum (WSF) – can become a source of much optimism. Historically speaking, relative to past forms of democratic political action, they do seem quite dramatically new.57

What I’d like to do here, therefore, is to reflect briefly on the new political imaginaries inscribed in the present conjuncture of globalization, first by mentioning the nascent forms of an emergent global Left, and then by showing how globalization also creates redoubts of the most reactionary thinking on which a new politics of the Right can draw.

In using the term of ‘an emergent global Left’ I want to be avowedly cautious, for what I really mean is a Left whose forms of thought and organized action are only prospectively becoming realigned, extremely slowly and unevenly, in larger than national-state ways. In that respect I’m certainly thinking of the new anti-globalization activism, with its respective intersections in the protests against G8 and IMF summits, the growth of the WSF and its regional equivalents, and the massed transnational demonstrations against the war in Iraq, together with its associated slogans of ‘We Are Everywhere’, ‘A Movement of Movements’, and ‘Another World Is Possible’. The corollary of these actions has been the coalescence of a revived anti-capitalist discourse, evidenced in a wave of publication following the Seattle events, including substantial anthologies assembled by Joel Schalit, Emma Bircham and John Charlton, Notes from Nowhere, and Tom Mertes, and a variety of popularizing guides to analysis and action by John Carter and Dave Morland, Simon Tormey, Alex Callinicos, and others.58 The acknowledged founding event of this recharged anti-capitalist political formation, one that was also called into being by the transnational political framing of globalization as I’ve described it, was the emergence of the Zapatistas in response to the inauguration of NAFTA on January 1, 1994. We could then add the campaigns materializing during the 1990s against globalized sweatshop labour;59 a broader politics of anti-corporate activism;60 and the appearance of emblematic texts like Naomi Klein’s No Logo and Noreena Hertz’s Silent Takeover, which helped crystallize emergent radical democratic and critical-liberal publics in the metropolitan West, or Arundhati Roy’s Cost of Living, which spoke across the North-South divide.61

A notable feature of this anti-capitalist discourse has been the marking out of a general societal critique, whose importance can hardly be underestimated given the successful banishing from the public sphere of socialist advocacy, which always provided the main earlier source of such
oppositional talk. Here I mean the kind of critique (as Fredric Jameson recently put it) whose terms ‘could not be fulfilled or satisfied without transforming the system beyond recognition, and which would at once usher in a society structurally distinct from this one in every conceivable way, from the psychological to the sociological, from the cultural to the political’.62 By now, as Jameson says, even the most basic form of ameliorative materialist demand qualifies for such practical utopianism, including ‘full employment, universal full employment around the globe’, whose pursuit and possible terms of realization have come to presuppose the most revolutionary of political entailments. Accordingly, we need to ask, again with Jameson: what is the utopia of globalization? More practically put, that means: what are globalization’s distinctive social relations; what forms of culture and belief are being generated; and what forms of politics might be predicated around them?

What remains hardest to imagine and strategize here is the process of building links from the intermittent explosions of concentrated and spectacular transnationalized protest like Seattle and Genoa, and from the dispersed, localized, and decentred forms of activity we mainly know as the anti-globalization movement, to sustained and organized action at the level of states and their new supranational governmental equivalents. In principle that goal is perhaps not so dissimilar from the earlier tasks of organizing society-wide labour movement-centred democratic parties within national states, which in the most fundamental terms meant the ‘effort at continuity in working-class culture’, as the title of an old article in labour history once called it.63 Yet under the globalized equivalent of those circumstances both the logistics and the theoretical arduousness of tackling that question on a transnational scale have become immeasurably more difficult.64

The least fruitful perspective for me is the one advanced by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, which specifically refuses these questions of organized co-ordination on grounds expounded in their two books Empire and Multitude.65 Those works develop hyper-abstracted claims about the transformation of political sovereignty under neoliberal globalization (‘Empire’), without ever explicating the particular histories that might clarify the entailments for focused and future-directed democratic practice. Hardt and Negri hold a place for revolutionary transformation in implicitly institutional terms linked to the idea of ‘a strong event, a radical insurrectionary demand’, in a way that seems assimilable to the political category of revolution as classically understood.66 But they deliberately abstain from any concretizing of how ‘the constituent power of the multitude’ (theorized only ‘ontologically’ and ‘sociologically’) might pass politically into the desired-for revolutionary ‘moment of rupture’.67

Beyond the elusive claims of ontological ‘commonalty’, they do situate the multitude’s presence inside ‘the cooperative and communicative networks of social labor’. But the crucial political questions of ‘What Is To Be Done?’ – of how ‘a world beyond sovereignty, beyond authority,
beyond every tyranny’ is to be practically organized, within an institutional field of ‘guarantees and constitutional motors’ – is wilfully not faced.\textsuperscript{68} When pressed, they concede only the most starkly dichotomized of political choices, one that pits the most limited kind of reformism, institutionally bounded by national constitutionalist politics, against the most maximalist of grassroots activisms, conceived in kaleidoscopic and shape-shifting localist terms: ‘either one can work to reinforce the sovereignty of nation-states as a defensive barrier against the control of foreign and global capital; or one can strive towards a non-national alternative to the present form of globalization that is equally global’.\textsuperscript{69} Yet that missing question of ‘articulation’, the practical and strategic difficulties of how to negotiate back and forth between different scales of action, different forms of demand, different sites of political pressure, different geopolitical locations, different institutional concentrations of power, whether nationally, globally, or locally, has precisely the greatest urgency, one might say.\textsuperscript{70}

The dangers of ignoring such practical exigencies of organized, strategic, and discursive articulation become all the more apparent once we turn to the opposing end of the political spectrum and consider the effects of globalization on the cultural politics of the Right, where the main logic has become a kind of involution. For large sectors of opinion in the advanced capitalist or metropolitan societies, the new transnational liquidities have inspired xenophobia, cultural racism, and general ideological retrenchment, particularly in response to the mass labour migrations, the movements of asylum-seekers and refugees, and the growing porousness of borders. These consequences of the globalization process are being driven deep into the everyday politics of the metropolis, as recent events in France so dramatically showed, both in the urban insurrection of autumn 2005 and in the subsequent turmoil that blocked the proposed youth employment legislation. But in these respects the generative logic of globalization, even if we take Hardt and Negri’s ontological and sociological claims on their own terms, is assembling a kind of ‘multitude’ whose forms of presence, incitements to thought and action, and discernible political effects have no single direction or bundle of potentials, but on the contrary require both careful analysis and hard political labour. In this respect certain aspects of the grandiose ideological or discursive consequences of globalization inside the European political space deserve particular attention.

During the past few years a strong politico-cultural imaginary of ‘Europe’ has often been counterposed against the unilateralism of the Bush administration in the United States, whether construed narrowly via the European Union, hitched to some future attainment of a more strongly federated Europe, or postulated in some distinct and superior civilizational terms. Both affirmatively inside Europe itself and pejoratively in the Rumsfeldian rhetoric of ‘Old Europe’, these constructions acquired great political urgency in the build-up towards the Iraq War. Thus the urgent plea for a common European vision (‘the consciousness of a shared
political fate, and the prospect of a common future’) grounded in shared cultural goods issued during that time by Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida not only bespoke the codified heritage of ‘Western civilization’; it was also filtered through some enduring assumptions about popular culture. Yet in the circumstances of the early 2000s, in the new social landscapes being shaped by capitalist restructuring, with their deindustrialized ruins, class decomposition, and post-Fordist disarray, for example, European popular cultures could no longer be treated as a source of oppositional meanings as they might once have been. The old and resilient political cultures of the Left, which between the late nineteenth century and the 1970s proved so effective in allowing society’s dominant values to be contested in collective and organized ways, no longer commanded democratic capacities as before. The ‘ordinariness’ of culture could no longer be imagined in the earlier registers of a socialist and class-based collectivism, which still retained extensive social purchase in the 1950s and 1960s. From a contemporary vantage-point, in fact, culture’s ‘ordinariness’ needs to be engaged on at least two other fronts: that of a multicultural or multi-ethnic heterogeneity, which poses unresolved challenges to progressive political culture; and that of an introspectively nationalist populism, which takes the presence of ‘foreigners’ or ethnically isolable minorities as incitements to violent boundary-drawing and cultural demarcation. In neither of those contexts did the imagining of a European future in the way envisioned by Habermas and Derrida carry much appeal.

That invoking of a ‘common European home’, as Mikhail Gorbachev once called it, usually rests upon the claim to a distinctive and coherent history. This is what Adolf Muschg called ‘sharing a common destiny’ in his contribution to the Habermas/Derrida initiative:

What holds Europe together and what divides it are at heart the same thing: common memories and habits, acquired step by step through the process of distancing itself from fatal habits. Europe is what Europe is becoming. It is neither the Occident nor the cradle of civilization; it does not have a monopoly on science, enlightenment, and modernity. It shouldn’t attempt to ground its identity in any other way than through its own experiences: any claims for exclusivity can only lead into the same delusion and pretension through which Europe of the nineteenth century believed itself to represent the rest of the world, and entitled to dominate it.

But for all the new modesty and affected humility of its terms, this claim to a common culture is predicated on a silence. Europe’s actually existing diversity of contemporary populations, whether considered via the bare bones demography of migrancy, ethnicity, language, and religious affiliation, or through more complex sociologies and cultural formations, radically exceeds such appeals to discretely unfolding histories held in common.
In fact, far more than a mere silence is entailed here: such advocacy for the vaunted political community of ‘Europe’ requires an active *disremembering* or *repression* of certain significant histories before the hoped-for ‘official memory’ of liberal or social-democratic intellectuals like Habermas can become enabled. Instantiating this ‘Europe’ as a widely agreed object of political aspiration, no less than earlier political and cultural constructions of the nation, actively presupposes such a work of forgetting and repression.

That emerges with unfailing clarity from Hans-Ulrich Wehler’s response to the Habermas/Derrida manifesto. For Wehler, whose impeccably liberal advocacy has helped define the historical groundedness of contemporary political debates across four decades, one of the key problems left unresolved by Habermas and Derrida is the issue of ‘Europe’s borders’. More specifically, this is a problem of Europe’s opening to ‘the east and southeast’:

White Russia [sic], the [sic] Ukraine (which has already introduced a parliamentary and governmental resolution to join the EU by 2011), Moldova, Russia itself, and Turkey in particular have never been part of a historic Europe. They do not live off the legacy of Judaic, Greek or Roman antiquity that is present in Europe to this day. They have not fought their way through the far-reaching separation of state and church, and have even returned, as they did after the Bolshevik or Kemalist intermezzo, to a symbiotic relationship between the two. They have not experienced any Reformation and, even more importantly, hardly any ‘Enlightenment’. They have produced no European bourgeoisie, no autonomous European bourgeois cities, no European nobility, and no European peasantry. They have not participated in the greatest achievement of European political culture since the late nineteenth century: the construction of the social welfare state. Cultural divergences are deeply engraved in Europe. Orthodox Christendom still differs greatly from a Protestant and Roman Catholic Europe that also remains separated from the Islam of Turkey by an obvious cultural barrier.\textsuperscript{75}

In its guileless iteration of the most classical of Eurocentrisms, this is a remarkable statement, which speaks as much to an exclusionary logic of cultural centredness inside German society as it does to the maintenance of Europe’s boundaries against a particular state. Wehler had ignited controversy several years before with an article in *Die Zeit* arguing unambiguously against Turkey’s putative accession to the EU. In an associated interview, moreover, he insisted that ‘peaceful coexistence’ with Germany’s Turkish immigrants ‘really does not work’: ‘The Federal Republic does not have a foreigner problem, it has a Turkish problem. The Muslim diaspora is essentially not capable of integration’. Germany had dealt successfully with its various immigrations since the Republic’s foundation, ‘but at some point a boundary is reached’.\textsuperscript{76} This standpoint
was further embedded in an orientalist outlook of startling simplicity, questioning the Islamic world’s capacity for democracy, invoking many centuries of a ‘clash of civilizations’ between the Ottoman Empire and Christendom, and generalizing its arguments on to a European scale (‘Everywhere in Europe Muslim minorities are showing themselves not assimilable, huddling defensively in their subculture’). Wehler painted a lurid picture of the great Anatolian unwashed, massing on the frontier in their millions, awaiting only the opening of the EU’s labour market. As Rita Chin remarks, ‘he even revived one of the Enlightenment’s oldest tropes of absolute difference, comparing 65 million contemporary Turks to Ottoman hordes at the gates of Vienna’.

What has been striking about Western European debates such as these is the degree to which the racialized terms of so many contemporary anxieties about the workability of received and emergent political arrangements, and the stability of their social bases, are at the same time so profoundly embedded in the discursive architecture of political debate yet still remain unspoken. Of course, in actuality ‘race’ is speaking itself with troubling volubility, in a cacophony of conflicting and frequently violent ways. On the one hand the overt racisms of the far Right, and on the other hand the collective actions of beleaguered minorities, have been marking out the social and cultural space of racialized political understanding for some three or four decades, varying country by country and locality by locality. But the manner in which this particular part of the European political unconscious might be brought productively and democratically into voice remains anything but clear.

**END POINT**

It would be perverse to end an essay on the political framing of globalization, and the importance of historicizing the latter, without mentioning what remains the overriding single orientation point of the global present, namely, the consequences of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center. My own initial reaction to that event, in the context of the extraordinary spectacle of the attacks themselves, was to anticipate a powerfully concerted backlash against the nascent anti-globalization movement, which would use the iconic imagery of the destruction of the Twin Towers as a means of delegitimizing any future expressions of activism. Of course much of that process has indeed occurred, although after the initial shock effects the various elements of the global justice movement have rather successfully regrouped, not least under the aegis of the gathering opposition against the Iraq War. Moreover, when the representational repertoire surrounding 9/11 becomes so crassly commodified, when the commemorative politics becomes so easily mired in the wrangling of competing commercial, propertied, municipal, civic, victimological, and public claims, and when a polemicist like Ann Coulter can accuse four
9/11 widows of luxuriating narcissistically in their own bereavement, it becomes clear that the public sphere has passed beyond any straightforward forms of Gleichschaltung or coordination.81

Characterizing 9/11’s global impact will certainly require more than a few paragraphs of reflection.82 Fred Halliday, in one useful conspectus, outlines three clear dimensions to that impact on the world, distinguishing between the consequences for US public opinion, the unleashing of an aggressive new dynamism in US foreign policy, and the reconfiguring of US relations with the rest of the world.83 Uniting each of those areas are elements of tension relating to Muslims, Arabs and Islamic political activism which run increasingly counter to any benignly transnationalizing logics of globalization. Indeed, such tensions are having the opposite effect by allowing older political boundaries to be reconstituted. They do so partly by emphasizing the power disparities between the advanced capitalist countries and the rest, which in military, diplomatic, and fiscal terms are still organized mainly in older national-state ways. By harnessing the new fearful and angry patriotisms focused around the permanent emergency of the ‘war against terror’, they also allow the older national-state identifications to be resoldered back together. As those forms of highly mobilized patriotic defensiveness become driven deeper and deeper into the ‘homelands’ of national political consciousness, they potentially form the focus for a general political realignment. Inside the United States those dynamics of patriotic rallying are palpable enough, both licensing the strengthening of the ‘security state’ and hardening intolerance against difference and dissent. In ‘fortress Europe’ they threaten to converge, country by country and with ever-greater logics of equivalence, to the possibility of an in-turned and recentred pan-European anti-Islamic racism. Whatever the strength of the superordinate transnational political arrangements imagined by the advocates of ‘global governance’, in other words, any transference of popular political loyalties in such directions still has a very long way to go.

However, the power of globalization as a discursive formation – as that demonstrated unity of talk and practice I suggested at the outset of this paper – does have a vital political consequence. That very recurring of political allegiance and affiliations to a dangerous and fearful ground of national-state patriotism is hard-wired to a ruthlessly compelling claim on the part of the governments in power that the severity of the crisis both licenses and requires their non-accountability. And that immunity from constitutional oversight is consistently defended by the exigencies of a state of emergency which is explicitly presented in global terms. On the one hand, the ‘global war against terror’ is justified by a conception of ‘freedom’ deemed to be global in its mainsprings and reach. On the other hand, the sovereignty of decision-making is resituated beyond the established constitutional lines of referral. That logic of emphatic non-accountability is also unfolding at a time when the historic infrastructures of democratic citizenship in advanced capitalist societies – from mass-membership parties
and associational solidarities to community-based structures of national political affiliation and the very exercise of citizenship through the vote – have fallen into an advanced state of dissolution. Accordingly, even as the largest transnational massed demonstrations of democratic citizenship ever recorded in the history of the integrated world were occurring in February 2003, the locus of political decision-making was shifting further and further away from accountability. Secure in their reliance on the higher necessities of global security, governments could simply sit the protests out.

**Geoff Eley** is Karl Pohrt Distinguished University Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. He is the author of *Forging Democracy: the History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000* (2002) and *A Crooked Line: From Cultural History to the History of Society* (2005); and co-author with Keith Nield of *The Future of Class in History: What’s Left of the Social?* (2007). He has also published widely in German history of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He is currently writing a general history of Europe in the twentieth century.

**NOTES AND REFERENCES**

This article originated in a paper first delivered at a Conference on ‘Perspectives on Globalization’ at the University of Nevada, Reno in April 2006, and then in an expanded version at the Tepoztlán Institute for the Transnational History of the Americas in Tepoztlán, Mexico, in late July-early August 2006. I’m grateful to audiences and colleagues on both occasions for their comments, ideas, and reactions. I’m especially indebted to the following either for a longstanding conversation around the subjects of this article or for the critical reassurance of their readings: Charles Bright, Vinayak Chaturvedi, Jessica Dubow, Dennis Dworkin, Julia Hell, Young-son Hong, Jennifer Jenkins, Paul Kramer, Gina Morantz-Sanchez, Dirk Moses, Ken Pomerantz, Moishe Postone, Carolyn Steedman, George Steinmetz, Ron Suny, Dennis Sweeney, Charles Tshimanga-Kashama, and Jeff Wasserstrom. Jessica Dubow got me started with the overarching arguments. Carolyn Steedman inspired me to think differently about the histories of capitalism and working-class formation. Young-sun Hong and Dennis Sweeney gave me especially careful and searching readings, identifying important places where my arguments needed to be clarified.


3 *Reordering the World: The Long-Term Implications of September 11*, London, 2002. The Foreign Policy Centre was launched by Tony Blair and Robin Cook in 1998 with the aim of developing a ‘vision of a fair and rule-based world order’. See the website at

4 Cooper, ‘New Liberal Imperialism’ (as note 3).


7 I’m well aware here that the analysis of international relations, and the dynamics of US foreign policy making in particular, will require far more elaborate and nuanced treatment than this sharply binarized framework can suggest. For an admirably clear, theoretically sharp, and economical starting-point, which also uses regulation theory to explore how the post-9/11 political crisis and global capitalist restructuring can be related together, see George Steinmetz, ‘The State of Emergency and the Revival of American Imperialism: Toward an Authoritarian Post-Fordism’, Public Culture 15:2, spring 2003, pp. 323–45. For an uncomfortable and starkly rationalist accounting of the arguments on either side of the decision for war in March 2003, see Perry Anderson, ‘Casuistries of Peace and War’, London Review of Books, 6 March 2003, p. 12.

8 This is the argument brilliantly developed in RETORT (Iain Boal, T. J. Clark, Joseph Matthews and Michael Watts), Afflicted Powers: Capital and Spectacle in a New Age of War, London, 2005, especially chap. 2, ‘Blood for Oil?’, pp. 38–77, where the concept of ‘military neo-liberalism’ is proposed in criticism of the blunter attributions of US policy to the dominance of an interest-based and manipulative power bloc of big oil interests and military contractors. We may acknowledge the sometimes astonishingly naked exertion of influence by this latter-day military-industrial complex, together with all the associated chicanery, dissimulation, and profiteering, without effacing the wider political assumptions and grand-historical claims structuring the PNAC’s strategic vision.


13 Again, see Steinmetz, ‘State of Emergency’.


15 One of the difficulties in writing anything sensible or useful about globalization today is the simply bewildering profusion of literatures relevant to the topic, issuing from an unmanageable diversity of academic disciplines and public sources, some of which (in sociology, economics, anthropology, communications, literature, history, and cultural studies, or broader cross-disciplinary fields like postcolonial studies) barely worry about noticing or speaking to one other. Some of my own preferred guides will become apparent from the footnotes, although others e.g. the writings of Stuart Hall) won’t be as visible in that respect. One of the best starting-points is now Postcolonial Studies and Beyond, ed. Ania Loomba, Suvir Kaul, Matti Bunzl, Antoinette Burton, and Jedd Esty, Durham, NC, 2005. Otherwise, during the past decade and a half the following additional texts not cited in the footnotes below have been especially key for my own thinking: Roger Rouse, ‘Mexican Migration and the Social Space of Postmodernism’, Diaspora 1, 1991, pp. 8–23; Stuart Hall, ‘When Was the “Postcolonial”? Thinking at the Limit’, in The Post-Colonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons, ed. Iain Chambers and Lidia Curti, New York, 1998; Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation, ed. Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins, Minneapolis, 1998; Fernando Coronil, ‘Beyond Occidentalism: Towards Non-Imperial Geohistorical Categories’, Current Anthropology 1, 1996, pp. 51–87, and ‘Towards a Critique of Globalcentrism: Speculations on Capitalism’s Nature’, Public Culture 12: 2, spring 2000, pp. 351–74; Saskia Sassen, ‘Spatialities and Temporalities of the Global: Elements for a Theorization’, Public Culture 12: 1, winter 2000, pp. 215–32.


17 For some careful thoughts on the issue of periodization, emphasizing the early nineteenth-century and early modern contexts of global integration, see Adam McKeown, Periodizing Globalization, in this issue (History Workshop Journal, 63, spring 2007).

18 See Cooper, Colonialism in Question, pp. 111, 110, 104. For a superb study of the long nineteenth century, giving globalization its deeper history and emphasizing the importance of ‘great accelerations’, see Christopher A. Bayly, The Birth of the Modern World 1780–1914: Global Connections and Comparisons, Oxford, 2004, especially pp. 451–87, ‘Conclusion: The Great Acceleration, c.1890–1914’. At the very least, I’d argue, we are currently living through another such great acceleration, which got underway during the mid 1970s.


29 Friedman, ‘Manifesto for a Fast World’, pp. 84, 96.

30 Friedman, ‘Manifesto for a Fast World’, p. 43.


40 To the labour regimes of slavery and servitude Linebaugh and Rediker have added a third, namely that of the sailing ship, which they claim as the site of production characteristic of the Atlantic arena of globalization in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, *The Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic*, London, 2002. Linebaugh first developed this argument in an essay of 1982, which remains foundational for what became the field of Atlantic studies:

> By the end of the seventeenth century we may distinguish four ways by which capital sought to organize the exploitation of human labour in its combination with the materials and tools of production. These were first, the plantation, in many ways the most important mercantilist achievement; second, petty production such as the yeoman farmer or fortunate artisan enjoyed; third, the putting-out system which had begun to evolve into manufacture; and the mode of production which at the level of circulation united the others, namely the ship'.


43 It remains axiomatic for my understanding of the argument in these paragraphs that between the later 1940s and mid 1970s Western Europe’s period of relatively humanized capitalism under the aegis of the Keynesian/welfare-state synthesis was no less beholden to systems of globalized exploitation of natural resources, human materials, and grotesquely unequal terms of trade than the periods that came before or since. The privileged metropolitan prosperity of the long boom in which social-democratic gains were embedded rested (systemically, constitutively) on historically specific repertoires of extraction and exploitation operating on a world scale. Amidst all the contemporary talk of colonialism and postcoloniality, of globalization and ‘empire’, in this regard, a workable theory of *imperialism* remains in urgent need of recuperation. For one starting-point, see Alain Lipietz, ‘Towards Global Fordism?’, and ‘Marx or Rostow?’, *New Left Review* 132, March–April 1982, pp. 33–47, 48–58.

44 For an earlier reflection seeking to make the possible meanings of this immediate post-socialist conjuncture more complex, see Geoff Eley, ‘Reviewing the Socialist Tradition’, in *The Crisis of Socialism in Europe*, ed. Christiane Lemke and Gary Marks, Durham, NC, 1992, pp. 21–60.


55 See especially Mary Kaldor, *Global Civil Society: an Answer to War Cambridge, 2003; Akira Iriye, Global Civil Society: the Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary World, Berkeley, 2002; Held, Democracy and the Global Order; and Re-Imagining Political Community*, ed. Archibugi, Held, and Köhler. See also John Rennie Short, *Global Dimensions: Space, Place and the Contemporary World*, London, 2001, pp. 84–5, for ‘an example of good globalization [the campaign for eradication of polio initiated by Rotary International in 1990], a case where a combination of international civil society, international organizations and nation-states combined to produce good things’. For ‘global governance’ see the website of the Policy Network launched in December 2000 by Tony Blair, Gerhard Schröder, Giuliano Amato, and Göran Persson following the


64 Strikingly, this issue of the institutionalizing of protest was omitted from the terms of discussion in Understanding September 11, ed. Calhoun, Price, and Timmer.


66 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, p. 358.

67 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, p. 357.

68 Hardt and Negri, Multitude, p. 354.


71 See Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, ‘February 15, Or, What Binds Europeans Together. Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in a Core Europe’, in Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations after the Iraq War, ed. Daniel Levy, Max Pensky, and John Torpey, London, 2005, p. 7. In Umberto Eco’s contribution to the initiative proposed by Habermas and Derrida, ‘An Uncertain Europe between Rebirth and Decline’, he itemized Western civilization’s characteristics as follows: ‘the fundamental principles of the so-called Western world, the Greek and Judeo-Christian heritage, the ideas of freedom and equality born out of the French Revolution, the heritage of
modern science that started with Copernicus, Galileo, Kepler, Descartes, and Francis Bacon, the capitalistic form of production, the secularization of the State, Roman or Common Law, the very idea of justice achieved through class struggle (all typical products of the European Western world, and we could cite many more) are nowadays no longer the exclusive domain of Europe. On the contrary, they have spread and become popular in America, Australia, and – although not everywhere – in many parts of Asia and Africa: *Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe*, p. 15.


73 Nor, we might add, do they provide much evidence for the practical realization of the political fantasy of the Multitude.

74 Adolf Muschg, ‘“Core Europe”: Thoughts about the European Identity’, *Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe*, p. 26.

75 Hans-Ulrich Wehler, ‘Let the United States Be Strong! Europe Remains a Mid-Size Power: A Response to Jürgen Habermas’, *Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe*, p. 121.


80 Here I deliberately substitute ‘global justice’ for ‘anti-globalization’ as this seems a far more productive umbrella designation, whether politically or descriptively.


82 For best guidance, see Steinmetz, ‘State of Emergency’. Otherwise see the various essays in *Understanding September* 11, ed. Calhoun, Price, and Timmer.
