URING the 1970s anthropologists Sidney W. Mintz and Richard Price proposed a model to explain identity formation among Africans and African-descended peoples in plantation America. For two decades their creolization model dominated American slave culture interpretations, but in the 1990s Africanists challenged the model, asserting that it overstated the cultural diversity of sub-Saharan Africa, that it overstated the degree of ethnic heterogeneity characterizing the human cargoes of most slavers, and that it understated the possibilities for victims of the slave trade to reconstitute coherent ethnic cultures in the New World. The heated controversy that emerged pitted a group of mostly Africanist scholars who might reasonably be considered the intellectual descendants of Melville J. Herskovits against mostly Americanist disciples of Mintz and Price. The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database promised tools that could offer much more specific understandings of the relationships between Old and New World African cultures, and various historians sought to understand the degree and rate of cultural change that occurred during the Middle Passage and American slavery.¹

Notwithstanding the intensity of these debates, empirical work has increasingly rendered the dispute meaningless. What Mintz and

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William and Mary Quarterly, 3d ser., 68, no. 2, April 2011
DOI: 10.5309/willmaryquar.68.2.0181
Price termed creolization has been pushed from the Americas to the African continent, where it began long before the slave trade reached its height. Scholars have discovered and analyzed similar cultural change in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century African places that the Atlantic trade barely touched. Should scholars understand the cultures we have called creole to be extensions of African practices, or does the discovery of these changes make the cultures of many peoples living in Africa inauthentically African? The emptiness of this question and of the arguments made answering it becomes even clearer when examining other residents of the Atlantic basin. Analogous changes occurred among many indigenous American peoples in British, French, and Iberian America, though subdisciplinary divisions within the academy have caused scholars to label these changes ethnogenesis. How should we think through the similarities and differences between the ways the natives of present-day Georgia and Alabama became the Creeks and the ways residents of present-day coastal Chile became the Mapuches? How do various African and Amerindian stories compare with those of different European settlers developing New World identities from British Nova Scotia to the Dutch West Indies to New Spain, Brazil, and the Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata? And what about the emergence of various regional and national identities in Europe during this period?

What, in short, happens when one moves beyond the labels that separate interpretations of the creole cultures of African Americans, the hybrid cultures of Europeans, and the tribal cultures of Native Americans by placing all this ethnogenesis within the panhemispheric and pan-Atlantic processes that linked them to one another? The Americas were made up of myriad colonial territories, each unique and changing over time. Africa and Europe were equally diverse. In scholarly arguments over creolization, or the transmission of ethnic cultures, or the nature of Native American cultures, or comparisons among different European imperial projects, it sometimes seems that generalizations leap ahead of the careful empirical mapping of experience on which they should be based. To invert one of the most frequently invoked criticisms one hears at scholarly conferences, many of our histories of cultural change in the Atlantic world are overtheorized. There is no better example of this assertion than the refusal in Anglo-American historiography to see the many mestizos and castas that populated the British Atlantic, a refusal that grows out of generalizations about Britons’ lack of openness to cross-racial marriage. Mixed communities sprouted on the western and eastern seaboards of the Atlantic Ocean, from New England to Senegambia. Yet too much scholarship continues to suggest that the English resisted mixing with Indians and blacks. In seventeenth-century Sierra Leone, English officers of the Royal African
Company behaved like typical Portuguese lançados in taking African wives and fathering mixed-race children who then sought to monopolize the coastal trade. The resulting trading families, including the Clevelands in the Sherbro region of modern-day Sierra Leone, had counterparts in the McGillivrays and McIntoshes who rose to leadership among Creek Indians and sought intensified trade with the British, Spanish, and Anglo-Americans in the early republican Southeast.²

Nor are the Creeks the only residents of North American borderlands whose history undercuts the old narrative that contrasts French trappers, willing to marry into Algonquian and Iroquois communities, to Anglo settlers, reluctant to take Indian wives. Differences in degree existed, but they have less to do with deep-seated national cultural differences than with historical contingency and demography. By the eighteenth century, the English usually could and did create enduring alliances with Amerindians—alliances that endured as long as the English thought them important enough to invest in and maintain—through their access to quality commodities that could be given as presents in woodland diplomatic rituals. French colonists in the Great Lakes were less numerous, came without wives, and had inferior commodities to give or trade, so they relied on marrying native women to seal alliances. But when, in the Hudson Bay, English settlers found themselves facing conditions similar to those experienced by the French in the pays d’en haut, they secured their positions by marrying into Algonquian clans.³ It should not be surprising that they did so.

There are equally persuasive counterexamples to the historiographical truism that Spaniards were more willing to mix with the natives than were other Europeans. Seventeenth-century Spaniards in eastern Texas never felt the need to strike alliances with the Caddo through marriage, though Spanish commodities were of far lesser quality than those of their imperial rivals. By contrast the French avidly sought Caddo wives. These patterns persisted into the eighteenth century as the Spaniards refused to marry into Apache and Comanche clans, though captive Spaniards married Comanches in Comanchería. Mestizaje in Texas occurred not through these marriage alliances but through the forced incorporation of captives into households as servants (criados) and the sexual exploitation


of dependent women that resulted. Similar patterns of forced *mestizaje* through captivity characterized the interactions between indigenous and Hispanic communities in the Spanish borderlands of Chile and New Mexico. These patterns are depressingly reminiscent of the origins of mulattoes in colonial British America.

To understand the cultural change experienced by the peoples of the Atlantic basin—whether called creolization, ethnogenesis, Anglicization, or the growth of nationalism—requires that scholars step back from typologies based on generalizations about various national-imperial Atlantic experiences; the processes that matter were indeed panhemispheric and pan-Atlantic, but they were fundamentally driven by local variables (contingency, geography, demography, and other material conditions) as they modified the beliefs that peoples from all three continents brought to their interactions. They did not follow reliable patterns; instead, they changed relentlessly over time and space. They reflected the “‘disembedding’ of individuals and institutions” that Robin Blackburn, building on Anthony Giddens, sees creating the specifically modern quality of Atlantic slavery and, by extension, of the Atlantic world. From one perspective Giddens’s insistence that the monetarization of everything fueled disembedding holds, but money worked its magic differently in different places among different peoples. Members of all groups, whether Amerindians struggling with the disembedding influences of the market

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*4 Juliana Barr, Peace Came in the Form of a Woman: Indians and Spaniards in the Texas Borderlands (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2007); Brian DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War (New Haven, Conn., 2008), 92; Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven, Conn., 2008), 175–77. On the forced incorporation of captives in the Spanish American borderlands, see James F. Brooks, Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2002); David J. Weber, Bárbaros: Spaniards and Their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment (New Haven, Conn., 2005), 221–56. As Ann Little pointed out to us at the 2009 William and Mary Quarterly–Early Modern Studies Institute workshop, there is something dangerously bloodless in bland invocations of “marriage alliances” as the key to *mestizaje*. It is impossible to reconstruct the role of force or consent in most cross-group sexual encounters, but it is certain that physical and other forms of coercion were often involved. Our interest in the emergence of new peoples should not obscure the role violence played. For a discussion of sexual coercion in North America, see Sharon Block, Rape and Sexual Power in Early America (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2006), esp. chap. 2.

*5 For a magisterial comparative study of Spanish American and British American settler societies that emphasizes timing and contingency as the cause of difference but is still too willing to draw rough generalizations as it overlooks the core of the British Atlantic, the Caribbean, and the borderlands of the Spanish Atlantic, see J. H. Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America, 1492–1830 (New Haven, Conn., 2006).

through the chaos caused by epidemic disease, Africans facing the upheavals shaped by war, drought, and slaving, or Europeans seeking opportunity through migration, responded by seeking to reembed themselves into communities, creating new identities rooted in the transformations that forged the early modern Atlantic world.

Sidney W. Mintz and Richard Price developed their creolization theory through study of the cultures created by enslaved people of African descent in the Caribbean, which casts an ironic light on recent studies of many of the peoples of Southeastern, Central, and West Africa. It seems increasingly clear that their model resonates with precolonial ethnogenesis in Africa itself, though it has been much criticized by Africanists. Most of precolonial Africa was dominated by relatively small polities, and they often engaged in aggression with an eye less to territorial aggrandizement than to the acquisition of dependents, since the control of labor, not land, conferred wealth and prestige. Because land could not be passed down as personal or dynastic inheritance, individuals accumulated wealth by holding slaves or the promise of future service. Most of those enslaved in Africa were acquired through warfare, and most communities included enslaved people. African polities, then, were constantly integrating ethnic outsiders before, during, and after the era of the Atlantic slave trade. The experience of captives disembedded from their natal communities and forced to adapt to new cultures was, therefore, an endemic condition that created ongoing ethnogenesis in precolonial African polities.

The resulting deeply ingrained cultural willingness to incorporate ethnic outsiders—and the recognition that one could, if enslaved, benefit by making oneself an attractive prospect for incorporation—played out in different ways depending on variations in the size and nature of polities, the roles of imperial interlopers, and the nature of local warfare. When, for example, eighteenth-century Portuguese and then Afro-Portuguese prazeros began to extract tribute from indigenous peasannies along the Zambesi River in present-day Mozambique, they bought and armed slaves from different nonlocal peoples to enforce their colonial rule. These originally multiethnic communities of armed slaves created their own language, spiritual traditions, and rituals. In time they developed a sense of themselves

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7 A similar process prevailed in many Amerindian colonial tribes in the New World. There is increasing consensus that “ethnicity” may be a misleading descriptor of the different corporate identities that prevailed in precolonial Africa for reasons that will become obvious. We use the term for convenience to refer to local identities among indigenous residents of West and Central Africa, but we do not intend to suggest that the ethnic identities that emerged in Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—Akan, Igbo, Temne, Yoruban, etc.—had stable meaning during the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries.
as an ethnic group, becoming the Chikunda people. A similar but different process occurred in West Central Africa during the seventeenth century, when young men who were enslaved by raiders and incorporated into warrior communities took on the Imbangala identity. They captured and sold many people into Atlantic slavery, but they incorporated others into their communities in forced ethnogenesis. Other Central Africans, people enslaved in their home villages or refugees from slaving wars, coalesced in defensible highland locations, and “retreats from warfare frequently” created “new ethnic and political identities.”

Nor were such processes in Africa limited to these admittedly unusual cases. Stephanie E. Smallwood and Alexander X. Byrd have traced the serial displacements and incorporations faced by those captured, enslaved, and traded among different indigenous peoples and then into the Atlantic world through the Bight of Biafra and the Gold Coast. Both scholars show that the kinds of cultural adaptation Mintz and Price located in the Middle Passage and the Americas are better understood to have been part and parcel of the experience of slavery within Africa. It is increasingly clear that many ethnic identities scholars have long read back onto the coastal regions of West Africa were products of slavery and diaspora.

The fluid state of cultural change Byrd and Smallwood describe reached its zenith in Sierra Leone after 1808, when the British began interdicting the Atlantic trade and their African colony became home to some sixty thousand liberated recaptives. It was in Sierra Leone that dozens of mutually unintelligible linguistic groups were brought together into multiethnic agrarian communities. There they embraced charismatic forms of Protestant Christianity and English as their lingua franca and developed several identities now associated with West African ethnic nationalism: Efik, Hausa, Igbo, and Yoruba. Something similar occurred in the Americas among the seventeen thousand liberated Africans who wound up in Trinidad and the Bahamas. The multiethnic and multilingual crowds sent by the British navy to the Caribbean as indentured laborers became “Yorubas” and “Congos” as well as Methodist (Bahamas) and Catholic
(Trinidad) English-speaking peasantry. The traditional arguments over creolization would treat those who remained Yoruba as having experienced different cultural development from those who became Methodists, but Rosanne Marion Adderly explodes this distinction in the New World just as David Northrup does in the Old World.¹¹

The strikingly similar—but never identical—ethnogenesis that occurred in these different African settings points to wider pan-Atlantic patterns. Joseph C. Miller argues that precolonial Africa was characterized by the plasticity and multiplicity of socially constructed identities.¹² This radical propinquity of Africans to invent and reshuffle social roles and networks helped the victims of Atlantic slavery adapt to the horrific oppression they faced once sold into the Americas. Whether reconstituting kith and kin, sponsoring urban mutual-aid societies, or forming mixed Afro-Amerindian communities, Africans established a wealth of racial, ethnic, and national identities in the Americas. These formulations have, once again, too often been analyzed through crude lenses that used real differences among the cultures of the enslaved to build grand comparative generalizations. It is time to step back from the generalizations and do a better job describing and mapping the differences.

The American regions that imported almost all enslaved Africans and thus drove the slave trade were Brazil and the Caribbean. Sugar production dominated these regions in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and into the nineteenth centuries.¹³ The brutal labor regime of sugar production and the harsh disease environment of the tropical regions in which sugar was grown resulted in horrible mortality rates and steady importations of newly enslaved Africans. Historians of the British Caribbean sometimes


¹² Joseph C. Miller makes this case powerfully. See Miller, “Retention, Reinvention, and Remembering: Restoring Identities through Enslavement in Africa and under Slavery in Brazil,” in Enslaving Connections: Changing Cultures of Africa and Brazil during the Era of Slavery, ed. José C. Curto and Paul E. Lovejoy (New York, 2004), 81–121.

stress the heterogeneity of the slaves who were forcibly sent to Jamaica and other islands, whereas historians of Luso- and Spanish America more often highlight continuities among the ethnic cultures of the Old and New Worlds. A growing appreciation of the cultural fluidity of Atlantic Africa and important empirical evidence about the permeability of the boundaries among the different African naciones in the New World cast doubt on the traditional comparison. 14 If, as Miller suggests, one of the most fundamental cultural traits that different African peoples brought to the Americas was the fluidity and adaptability that characterized interethnic relationships in the Old World, then the degree to which collective American identities coalesced under labels that reached back, however approximately, to African collective identities—Kongo, Calabar/Igbo, Coromantee, Nago/Lucumi, etc.—may reflect more about the institutional vehicles available to express identity in different New World societies than about cultural change. 15 These institutional differences were important, but their significance may have had more to do with shaping the direction of cultural change than with determining the speed or amount of change. 16

If scholars begin to conceive of the African ethnic brotherhoods common in much of Iberian America as institutional vehicles for ethnogenesis, the contrast between North and South American slave cultures acquires a new tint. The convoluted and diverse paths toward


15 Miller, “Retention, Reinvention, and Remembering.” We want to emphasize that this point cuts both ways. It casts as much new light on the underemphasis on Old World African cultures among many historians of British America as it does on the overemphasis on African continuities among some historians of the Caribbean and Iberian America.

16 We are not suggesting that the cultures of enslaved people in Jamaica and Brazil were the same; we are suggesting that the differences had less to do with the distance separating them from authentic African ethnic cultures than with the ways African peoples adapted to these different new places.
racial identity taken by the enslaved in eighteenth-century North America were shaped by demographic conditions and prevailing work regimes. There were fewer direct references to identities rooted in specific African ports of departure—fewer claims to be Calabars or Coromantees—and this difference is important. But the pathway that the enslaved traveled to become black Virginians may not have involved more cultural adaptation and invention than that traveled by those who became Nagos in Brazil, and it may well have been the openness to adaptation and reinvention that was most authentically African in each case. Other North American creoles of African descent came to develop common African identities. Held loosely together by itinerant preachers and sailors, late-eighteenth-century Baptist, Methodist, and Quaker communities in the Chesapeake, New England, Nova Scotia, and Great Britain transformed the biblical narrative of Exodus into a utopian, commercial discourse of shared election. They included some who aspired to create alternative pan-Atlantic African mercantile networks that would allow the untapped economic resources of a continent to lift its peoples and those of its diaspora. In Spanish America the urban free blacks came to develop a strong corporate identity as *pardos*. Some sought to escape color-based limitations by buying documents from a cash-strapped monarchy that legally proved their whiteness, but many others saw themselves proudly as *pardos*. They enlisted in corporate militias that entitled them to special privileges and opened paths to upward social mobility. These *pardos* eventually managed to impose on the Spanish American creole elites a republican discourse of racial harmony and full citizenship for black creoles.  

If *pardo* republicanism and African churches stand at one extreme of ethnogenesis among African-descended peoples, *grand maronage* stands

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at the other. Runaway slaves came together in communities of different sizes throughout the Americas. Many were so small or fleeting that they left only traces in the documentary record. A few, like those that began in seventeenth-century Brazil, Jamaica, and New Spain and the eighteenth-century communities that coalesced in the region surrounding Suriname, became powerful enough and persisted long enough to stimulate major military expeditions against them. Some of these wars ended with colonial governments recognizing the maroon communities’ right to exist. Scholars know less than they should about the societies that emerged among these escaped slaves, but what we do know suggests a series of variations on the themes that emerge from the study of other African-descended peoples in the Americas. In the case of the great seventeenth-century Brazilian quilombo Palmares, and probably in the case of the seventeenth-century Jamaican peoples who coalesced in the eighteenth century into the Leeward and Windward Maroons, the communities originally consisted of Native American slaves or refugees who were joined by African slaves fleeing their masters. The populations of these large and persistent communities changed over time, with peoples from different parts of Africa gaining dominance at different times depending on local variations in the slave trade. But if Palmares toward its end appears to have been dominated by Angolans and Jamaican maroon communities had strong Akan influences when they signed treaties with the British, the diverse and changing histories of the people who made up those communities strongly suggests that they shared in the fluidity that characterized the identities and cultures of West and Central Africa in the age of the slave trade.  

Perhaps the clearest illustration of the futility of attempts to draw boundaries separating creole and African cultures comes in James H. Sweet’s forthcoming exploration of the life of Domingos Álvares, an eighteenth-century West African healer in the diaspora. Álvares was enslaved and sold to Brazil because his spiritual powers constituted a threat to the king of Dahomey. He continued to attempt to understand the world and the spirits once he left Naogon. He built on the knowledge

18 For a convenient summary of the recognition of negotiations with different maroon communities, see Alvin O. Thompson, Flight to Freedom: African Runaways and Maroons in the Americas (Kingston, Jamaica, 2006), chap. 9. On the changing composition of maroon communities in Jamaica and Brazil, see Michael Craton, Testing the Chains: Resistance to Slavery in the British West Indies (Ithaca, N.Y., 1982), 67–80, esp. 67–70; Alida C. Metcalf, Go-Betweens and the Colonization of Brazil, 1500–1600 (Austin, Tex., 2005), 173. The changing composition of maroon communities is most clearly described with regard to Palmares as well as the runaway communities in São Tomé in Sweet, “African Identity and Slave Resistance,” 233–42. For a fascinating study of the paradox of the remarkable stability of Saramaka oral traditions within a framework that fits this picture of fluidity and adaptation, see Richard Price, First-Time: The Historical Vision of an African American People (Baltimore, 1983).
that he brought across the Atlantic while incorporating various African and Portuguese beliefs and peoples into the healing communities that he established in different Brazilian settings before being swept into the repressive machinery of the Portuguese Inquisition. Banished to the Portuguese provinces, he found it more difficult to call together a congregation of followers, and he probably died a lost alien, struggling in the absence of the communities of believers that he had in Africa and Brazil. Notwithstanding Álvares’s tragic end, his story underscores the flexibility and creativity with which the actual victims of the slave trade sought to rebuild social ties that gave meaning to personhood, and in doing so it should make us leery of the inflexible categories scholars have too often imposed on the resulting processes.

**Amerindian ethnogenesis** looks similar to what historians of Africans in the Americas have called creolization, and it happened throughout the hemisphere. In the borderlands countless militarized ethnic groups emerged as so-called colonial tribes, and they often took sides in inter-European imperial rivalries. For too long scholars have artificially separated this type of ethnogenesis from creolization in Spanish American cities, where thousands of internal refugees and migrants used guilds and religious sodalities to re-create new ethnic identities. The parallels with Africans in America are obvious.

19 James H. Sweet, “Mistaken Identities? Olaudah Equiano, Domingos Álvares, and the Methodological Challenges of Studying the African Diaspora,” *American Historical Review* 114, no. 2 (April 2009): 279–306; Sweet, *Domingos Álvares, African Healing, and the Intellectual History of the Atlantic World* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2011). We thank Professor Sweet for allowing us to read the manuscript prior to publication and for numerous conversations that have influenced our interpretations.


21 We are not suggesting that Amerindian societies were unchanging before contact. The rise of empires in present-day Mexico and Peru as well as the demise of the Mississippian culture that produced Cahokia in the Mississippi River valley render such an interpretation untenable. We think that the rate of change and degree of resulting dislocation caused by the arrival of Europeans carrying Old World pathogens were different in kind from earlier changes. We are grateful to Steven Hackel for pointing out this possible implication of our argument. For a synthetic treatment of Native American prophetic traditions based on the assumption that native religions exhibited “a tendency toward innovation and adaptation by which one community influences the religious life of another community” prior to contact, see Lee Irwin, *Coming Down from Above: Prophecy, Resistance, and Renewal in Native American Religions* (Norman, Okla., 2008), 10.
the instance of the Amerindians as a result first and foremost of epidemic diseases, were threatened by the disruption of traditional village and kinship structures that defined personhood. In response they created new collectivities into which they were embedded, re-creating the conditions for social existence.

The colonial borderlands of the Americas witnessed the emergence of many new ethnic groups. Apaches, Caribs, Catawbas, Cherokees, Choctaws, Comanche, Creeks, Guaranies, Jíbaros, and Mapuches, to name just a few, were all new peoples who emerged in the wake of the demographic collapse and the interethnic wars that accompanied the arrival of Europeans. These polyglot communities were made up of internally displaced peoples, war refugees, and ethnic rivals who had been captured to replace those lost to disease and warfare, and thus to counteract the effects of shrinking populations. They moved quickly to adopt European captives, horses, and guns as they grew ever more enmeshed in Atlantic markets. In communities on the Andean eastern slopes, mestizos often came to occupy positions of authority and led pan-Indian nativist revolts. Children of European traders and native women often rose to leadership positions among North American peoples as well, but they more often advocated accommodationist strategies in opposition to pan-Indian movements. In Brazil, Central America, the Caribbean, Florida, and South Carolina, many of these colonial tribes also established complex relationships with blacks, sometimes helping to annihilate maroon communities, at other times returning runaway slaves, and occasionally incorporating large numbers of runaways to create Afro-Amerindian mixed communities.22

Intra-Indian mestizajes in the Spanish American highlands of Mexico and Peru also occurred as agrarian communities underwent profound changes. Colonization set off not only catastrophic demographic collapse but also huge internal migrations in which entire populations of forasteros, ethnically unattached wanderers, joined new communities. These mixed

communities were often led by new ethnic overlords brought from the outside by the Spaniards. Communities were further reshuffled by Spanish resettlement policies to bring the scattered survivors of the demographic collapse into new urban, civilizing spaces. Thus the precolonial panethnic polities of the Aztec and the Inca gave way to localized, closed corporate Indian colonial pueblos. These Indian pueblos embraced European animals, agrarian technologies, and Catholic devotions, producing new crops, trades, and local supernatural landscapes. Ethnogenesis did not, however, come to a halt with the formation of these pueblo peoples, since some individual pueblo Indians left to join the hacienda as serfs. Soon entire new communities emerged within Spanish latifundia. 23

Nor did the primarily local corporate ethnic identities of colonial tribes and Indian pueblos prevent some natives in North and South America from developing new pan-Amerindian identities. As North American natives lost land to European settlers and found themselves used by European rival powers as proxy armies, they managed to create interethnic bridges. The Indians’ new world was one in which residents of disparate villages, often composed of people from different tribes, sought to make sense of the dizzying array of changes that they experienced. Nativist millenarian resistance movements led by the likes of Pontiac and Tecumseh swept through eastern North America in the second half of the eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries. Drawing on creolized versions of Christian eschatological discourses, the natives launched coordinated raids against British soldiers and Anglo settlers. More importantly, many natives from

different tribes came to see themselves as one red people united against a common white foe.24

This process began in the second quarter of the eighteenth century, but it took off between 1763 and 1815, when the French were expelled from North America and the diminishing British and Spanish presence limited natives’ chances to find a middle ground among different European powers. Deteriorating conditions in Indian country helped give greater currency to spiritual and political leaders’ visions of native unity, and native prophets called on Indians throughout the Ohio and Mississippi River valleys to recognize that they were inherently distinct from white and black people and to reject those aspects of white culture that rendered Indians dependent on trade with settlers. They began to seize on long-standing indications that some Indians thought red people distinct from whites by calling on all red people to unify to defend Indian land and an Indian way of life. From the alliance between Delaware prophet Neolin and Ottawa military leader Pontiac to that between Shawnee brothers Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa, some North American natives came to believe that they could regain mastery over their own fate by rejecting ethnic rivalries that hindered resistance to whites. Indians had to recognize their common identity as Indians and band together against the settlers who sought to take their land.25 This cultural battle was fought on several fronts using a single weapon: an appeal to tradition. As most scholars of Native American history have noted, though the appeals were couched in the rhetoric of tradition, the cultural ideals called forth were innovative.26 Prophets implored their followers to regain contact with an original unity that had presumably been broken in recent history by what now appeared to have been mistaken traditions of warfare and rivalry. In this way a new red people was called into existence.

Similar pan-Indian identities surfaced in Spanish America. The late-eighteenth-century nativist revolt of Tupac Amaru in Cuzco and Tupac


25 White, Middle Ground, 493–517; Dowd, Spirited Resistance, chaps. 2, 5, 7.

26 Most of the historians of Amerindians cited in this article acknowledge the innovations introduced in these appeals to tradition. For one of the earliest and best analyses, see Anthony F. C. Wallace, The Death and Rebirth of the Seneca (New York, 1969). Gregory Evans Dowd shows that innovation was a part of traditional native spirituality, arguing that the paradox is less sharp than earlier scholars claimed. See Dowd, Spirited Resistance, esp. 1–22. This assertion parallels Joseph C. Miller’s later claim that fluidity and adaptability can be seen as African cultural attributes. See Miller, “Retention, Reinvention, and Remembering.”
Catari in Upper Peru (present-day Bolivia) created vast interethnic alliances unified by the aspiration of re-creating a utopian Inca Empire (whose contours were first invented by early-seventeenth-century mestizo writer Inca Garcilaso de La Vega) and driven by the will to cleanse the land of all Spaniards. Unsurprisingly, this uprising was ultimately defeated by the coordinated actions of settler militias and solidly pro-Spanish indigenous ethnic groups.27

Paradoxically, pro-Spanish Indian allies were the product of the juridically separatist legal institutions and practices of the colonial República de Indios. Separate courts along with specialized prosecutors, defendants, and notaries created a homogenized native culture of litigiousness that bolstered the Catholic monarchy’s authority as a legitimate dispenser of justice. Common labor and economic colonial practices also created pan-Indian identities. Despite the massive cultural and biological miscegenation, Indians became a clearly identifiable group of miserable. The church contributed mightily to the homogenization by creating indigenous lingua francas for catechization. In a continent teeming with hundreds of mutually unintelligible languages, missionaries composed and printed grammars, syntaxes, vocabularies, and devotional literatures in Guarani, Nahuatl, and Quechua, expanding the reach and range of these precolonial languages and thus facilitating the creation of the ethnic category of Indian. Missionaries also contributed to indigenous ethnogenesis by setting up borderland missions that more often than not worked as temporary refugee camps to homogenize multiethnic and polyglot populations.28


Catholicism integrated far-flung and unrelated indigenous communities into a common global discourse. Cuzqueño native elites, for example, managed to integrate Inca dynastic histories with those of the Jesuit order’s founders. As relatives of Ignacio de Loyola and Francisco de Borja married the female descendants of the last of the Incas, the native elites of the former Inca capital invented a dynastic discourse of kingship, institutionally connecting themselves to a religious order with a global outreach. These indigenous nobilities also commissioned paintings connecting Catholic sacred, global narratives firmly to Andean traditions and landscapes, including images of the Virgin Mary and baby Jesus sporting Inca attire, Inca magi visiting the manger, and Noah and the ark in the Andes. This tendency of Catholic Indian elites to use Catholic sacred history to insert themselves into global narratives often encouraged panethnic forms of identification. In eighteenth-century Tlaxcala, Puebla, for example, indigenous nobilities created a discourse of hemispheric Catholic Indian piety. The Tlaxcalan nobles’ chapel was decorated with paintings of local indigenous Catholic cults intended to show that from the seventeenth century Tlaxcala had been a privileged Catholic sacred space. These canvases included a picture of the apparition of the Virgin of Ocotlán and the Archangel Michael to Tlaxcalan Indian Juan Diego, but the chapel also included paintings of saintly Mohawk Catherine Tekakwitha and pious northern Peruvian Indian Nicolas Ayllón. Eighteenth-century Tlaxcalan nobles’ sense of identity ranged beyond their local polity to encompass Catholic Amerindians across the continent. At the same time that Anglo-African communities of Baptists and Methodists in Nova Scotia and Boston were casting themselves as new African Israelites, indigenous communities in central Mexico invented a world of panhemispheric Indian Catholic election.29

Catholicism offered Amerindian communities not only the discursive tools to position themselves within wider global religious communities but also great flexibility to adapt to changing conditions. Despite all its claims to uniformity and universality, Catholicism has always manifested itself as one form or another of local religion. Native Americans embraced aspects of the new religion according to context and circumstance. In the Saint Lawrence River valley, seventeenth-century Mohawk women such as Tekakwitha grafted Iroquois practices of ritual mourning onto forms

of Catholic piety through flagellation. The peculiar architecture of the
approximately four hundred immense Augustinian, Dominican, and
Franciscan monastic complexes that sprouted in central Mexico throughout
the sixteenth century—with open-air churches and large walled plazas
with small chapels in all four corners—can be explained by the eagerness
of Nahua communities to re-create in these new architecturally hybrid
spaces the carefully staged movements of the religious spectacles of their
pagan past. The pageantry of post-Tridentine Catholicism was embraced
creatively by each native community, including the wholesale adoption
of Renaissance perspective in thousands of murals to enhance the age-old
Nahua theatrical sense of the sacred. Scholars have been prone to dismiss
Catholicism among native communities as a shallow colonial veneer, barely
masking more authentic, traditional pagan religions. Such interpretation
hardly does justice to the dynamism and energy with which indigenous
communities throughout the Americas embraced, adapted, and changed
Catholic dogma and ritual. Behind the history of each popular Catholic cult
among Amerindians in the French, Portuguese, and Spanish Atlantic lies a
protean tale of relentless change and adaptability. 30

These many examples of adaptability throughout the New World
do not mean that Amerindians could only respond to the postcontact
challenges either by finding a place within the colonial order or
by appropriating European notions of race and religion in resistance
movements. On the Plains of North America, native peoples—especially
the Comanches, yet also the Cheyennes, Kiowas, Sioux and others—learned
to domesticate European-introduced horses, became master bison hunters,
and coalesced into powerful new imperial peoples. Though the disruptions

30 On the tendency of Catholicism to be both universal and local, see William
Christian Jr., “Catholicisms,” in Local Religion in Colonial Mexico, ed. Martin Austin
Nesvig (Albuquerque, N.Mex., 2006), 259–68. On the Mohawk incorporation of
Catholic rituals, see Greer, Mohawk Saint. On the indigenous embrace of Renaissance
perspective and the creation of new hybrid Christian space to enact precolonial
indigenous pageantry, see Samuel Y. Edgerton, Theaters of Conversion: Religious
Architecture and Indian Artisans in Colonial Mexico (Albuquerque, N.Mex., 2001); Jaime
Lara, City, Temple, Stage: Eschatological Architecture and Liturgical Theatrics in New
Spain (Notre Dame, Ind., 2004). For exemplary studies on the dynamism of indigenous
Catholic local religion in Spanish America, see William Taylor, Magistrates of the Sacred:
Priests and Parishioners in Eighteenth-Century Mexico (Stanford, Calif., 1996); Juan
Carlos Estenssoro Fuchs, Del paganismo a la santidad: La incorporación de los indios del
Perú al catolicismo, 1532–1750, trans. Gabriela Ramos (Lima, Peru, 2003); Taylor, “Two
Shrines of the Cristo Renovado: Religion and Peasant Politics in Late Colonial Mexico,”
American Historical Review 110, no. 4 (October 2005): 945–74. For a scholarly critique
of the historiography that has not treated the changing history of indigenous micro-
Christianities seriously in the Catholic Atlantic, see Allan Greer and Kenneth Mills, “A
Catholic Atlantic,” in The Atlantic in Global History, 1500–2000, ed. Jorge Cañizares-
and hardships that pushed these peoples toward new ways of life have largely been lost to history, the profundity of the changes they experienced is underscored by a creation tale that explained how a new people—the “Called Out People,” or Cheyennes—came into existence on the Plains.\textsuperscript{31}

The powerful native peoples that emerged on the Plains did so in symbiosis with adjacent European empires. They used guns and horses to raid their European and native neighbors and to hunt buffalo, and they traded buffalo products, especially robes made from buffalo skins, with residents of the Anglo-American, British, and Spanish empires, effectively tapping into Atlantic and global markets. They did not, however, either accommodate to or resist European peoples. Instead, as Brian DeLay and Pekka Hämäläinen have shown, the Comanches built a broad-ranging empire of their own, incorporating different native and European captives into their communities and controlling trade across the center of North America. The new communities into which various Kiowa, Wichita, and other native peoples incorporated themselves when searching for security in a rapidly changing world were neither pan-Indian nor colonial in any meaningful sense. They were part of a “multicultural and politically stratified imperial realm,” and newcomers secured their positions within that realm through “behavior and beliefs, not blood lineages.”\textsuperscript{32} They intermarried, becoming members of kinship networks and clans, and thus achieved personhood within Comanchería.\textsuperscript{33}

The range of responses across native groups in British, French, and Spanish America emphasizes the relative importance of contingency rather than metropolitan policy. Natives throughout the Americas, like residents of the slaving coasts of Africa and enslaved Africans in America, experienced wide-scale disruption as a result of the forces unleashed by Atlantic commerce. Like the African peoples discussed by Stephanie E. Smallwood, Joseph C. Miller, and others, native peoples responded to these disruptions by trying to re-create stable worlds in which they could reembed themselves in reliable communities. Sometimes that meant fighting to preserve traditional ways; sometimes, forging new ways of life and defending them as traditional; and sometimes, adapting to a changing commercial landscape.

\textbf{Though the most prominent ethnogenesis among European settlers and their descendants in North America involved the development of a racially}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[31] Elliott West, \textit{The Contested Plains: Indians, Goldseekers, and the Rush to Colorado} (Lawrence, Kans., 1998), 76.
\end{footnotes}
exclusive conception of nationalism in the United States, attention to local and regional developments reveals that Europeans experienced almost as diverse and multidirectional cultural change as did Amerindians and Africans. These processes, however, were not equivalent. The disembedding forces operating on Europeans were primarily rooted in markets and the comparatively voluntary ways that individuals and groups responded to them. If people make their own history out of conditions not of their choosing, different peoples have different degrees of control over those conditions. Europeans exerted much more influence than Indians or Africans over the ways they entered the Atlantic world, which often allowed them to negotiate the necessary cultural change from a position of relative strength.34 What it did not do is exempt them from the need to adapt.

One stimulus toward a white racial identity is not difficult to discern. As Jon Butler points out, by 1760 most of Britain’s mainland colonies south of New England “could form a cultural majority only by grouping together all white settlers, and then sometimes only barely.”35 Large populations of Dutch, English, French, and German speakers as well as Irish, Scots, and Scots-Irish people came to British North America prior to the Seven Years’ War, and they underwent polyvalent identity transformations as a result of their encounters with the material conditions and cultural diversity of the New World. Settlers from Scotland arrived in New Jersey a relatively heterogeneous group, but their Presbyterianism and shared difference from neighboring English settlers led them to develop a sense of themselves as Scots. Religion could pull an ethnic group together, but it could just as easily harden differences, as illustrated by the unifying effects of Lutheranism among some German-speaking immigrants and the more separatist tendencies of German Pietist communities. In both cases these new ethnic identities (as Scots and Germans, respectively) would blend into a monochromatic but heterogeneous mosaic of American nationalism after the Revolutionary War. The Huguenots may furnish the most complex case of simultaneous separatism and integration. Some of these refugees from religious persecution in France moved to the New World, where they built secretive communities through which they could cleave together as a spiritually separate people while blending seamlessly into a broader white American people. For all these peoples, transformations developed through engagement with the cultural, political, judicial, and economic institutions

34 That Europeans were responding to market forces is in keeping with Anthony Giddens’s claim that money was the key disembedding force fueling the rise of modernity. Given his primary interest in the sociology of the twentieth-century West, he had no reason to explore the disembedding caused by slavery in early modern Africa or epidemics in postcontact America.

that took shape in eighteenth-century North America. And, as was true for people of African descent, these New World transformations are best understood as intensifications of adaptive responses to the Atlantic world that began in the Old and helped fuel movement to the New World.

Europeans had been adapting to new conditions for millennia, and no one thinks they left static cultures to cross the Atlantic. It is difficult and almost pointless to separate the disruptive effects of the Reformation from those rooted in the creation of the Atlantic world, since one can neither imagine early modern European religious wars in the absence of Spain nor bracket out the role of New World wealth in Spanish interventions throughout the continent. The German Rhineland became a major source of immigrants to North America during the eighteenth century following a century during which Rhinelanders had moved locally and into eastern Europe in search of religious tolerance and economic opportunity. At the same time, the Rhineland became an immigration site, attracting setters from Swiss cantons during good times. Unsurprisingly, people with long-standing experience of chain migration created networks in Philadelphia that allowed them to reembed themselves in German communities once they arrived in the New World. The terms on which Europeans in America chose to create new communal ties varied in unpredictable ways, as underscored when the relatively fluid conceptions of German culture in much of Pennsylvania are compared with the more rigidly and self-consciously orthodox Dutch communities of New York. It seems that the constant flow of Rhinelanders to Pennsylvania fostered cultural flexibility, whereas the end of Dutch immigration led settlers to try to keep alien influences at bay through a commitment to cultural authenticity.


37 For the point that scholars too often characterize German society as “rooted, stable, and sedentary,” see Georg Fertig, “Transatlantic Migration from the German-Speaking Parts of Central Europe, 1600–1800: Proportions, Structures, and Explanations,” in Europeans on the Move: Studies on European Migration, 1500–1800, ed. Nicholas Canny (Oxford, 1994), 192–235 (quotation, 193). “Indeed it was common wisdom until the 1980s that ‘zero’ migration was the norm for all European communities...
White immigrants in North America forged a variety of local, ethnic, and religious identities as they sought to create new lines of personal and group association through which they could find economic security and cultural belonging.

Contemporary celebrants of the newly founded United States, and historians well into the twentieth century, highlighted the peaceful inclusion of religious and ethnic others from Europe while downplaying or overlooking those racial groups excluded from the American category. Perhaps the best eighteenth-century example is J. Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur's famous invocation in his *Letters from an American Farmer* of the "new race of men," the Americans.\(^{38}\) He praises the effortless inclusion of the descendants of the Dutch, English, and French but silently excludes the actual natives of the American continent and the Africans who had been brought to it.\(^{39}\) In fact, as the last several decades of scholarship have established, a white identity developed in the United States, or variant white identities developed in individual states, through the exclusion of blacks and Indians.

From legislative petitions in Virginia in the 1780s, to state constitutional debates in South Carolina during the 1790s, to racially exclusive ceremonies celebrating the new nation in northern towns and cities during the decades following independence, people of European descent in various localities throughout the United States made clear that their vision of the nation excluded black citizens. In 1790 the first federal naturalization act passed after the Constitution's adoption ratified that vision by offering the possibility of citizenship to any "free white"
immigrant who lived in the United States for two years.\footnote{James H. Kettner, *The Development of American Citizenship, 1608–1870* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1978), 236 (quotation). For an analysis that may overemphasize the importance of this law, see Matthew Frye Jacobson, *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race* (Cambridge, Mass., 1998), esp. 22–31.} Even as northern and southern states began down the roads that would lead one section to slavery and the other toward freedom, whites throughout the union expressed a growing sense that the American people were a white people.\footnote{For petitions to the Virginia legislature objecting to the 1782 manumission law, see Fredrika Teute Schmidt and Barbara Ripel Wilhelm, “Early Proslavery Petitions in Virginia,” *WMQ* 30, no. 1 (January 1973): 133–46. For the South Carolina constitutional debates, see Jack P. Greene, “Slavery or Independence: Some Reflections on the Relationship among Liberty, Black Bondage, and Equality in Revolutionary South Carolina,” *South Carolina Historical Magazine* 80, no. 3 (July 1979): 193–214. For racially exclusive parades, see David Waldstreicher, *In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776–1820* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1997), chap. 6. For the emergence of white identity in the Ohio Valley, see Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires*, 260–67.} Few were yet prepared to offer theories of polygenesis that questioned the Christian creation myth, but many Euro-Americans from across the social spectrum began to believe that whites constituted a race superior to black and, more ambiguously, red people.

This white American identity was built on the explicit rejection of the religious and national conflicts that had rendered Europe’s history so bloody. Popular anti-Catholicism notwithstanding, citizenship in the new American nation was open to any European who would willingly cast his or her lot with the United States (or one of its constituent states). The celebrated presence within the Continental army of European aristocrats such as the Marquis de Lafayette and Baron von Steuben underscored the belief that the New World empire of liberty was to be built by discarding the Old World class and national loyalties of its citizens.

Part of that impetus arose out of the very same violence that unleashed Amerindian ethnogenesis. Indian wars helped create the conditions for European settlers in North America to bridge wide ethnic divides. From Pennsylvania to South Carolina and Georgia, settlers of Dutch, English, French, German, and Scots-Irish descent came to see themselves as one American people battling ferocious savages in the eastern woodlands. The perception of Algonquian, Iroquoian, Muskogean, Siouan, and Timucuan tribes as a common ethnic enemy—which occurred even in the many cases in which Amerindians remained committed to tribal diversity—set off a panethic European self-identification that reinforced the divide between red and white peoples. The emergence of a common identity among whites fueled ethnicidal campaigns against the natives and stripped them of any future claims to citizenship in the new American nation. Moreover whites colonized the claim to being Americans just as they had colonized the land.
implicitly denying Amerindians’ much more compelling claim to that identity. From the nineteenth century to the present, later generations of creole descendents of European settlers would assert American identities against successive waves of immigrants.42

Intra-European ethnogenesis also took place in Spanish America. Despite many claims to the contrary, Spanish American settlers came from places other than Andalucia, Castile, and Extremadura. Spanish American cities received their share of Aragonese, Asturians, Basques, Flemish, French, Genoese, Germans, Greeks, Navarrans, Neapolitans, Sephardic Portuguese, and members of countless other linguistic-ethnic groups. Many, particularly those from the Iberian Peninsula, maintained strong transatlantic ethnic ties through extended family networks, guilds, cofradias, and other mutual-aid societies. Or perhaps, with more study, we will discover that they forged new transatlantic ethnic ties through these vehicles, much as scholars now know African settlers did. In time, however, members of rival ethnic groups developed common identities as vecinos, members of a shared urban patria. Centrifugal ethnic identities thus often coexisted with strong centripetal urban ones. The urban character of intra-European ethnogenesis was local and parochial, yet settlers also developed a precocious pan-Spanish ethnicity. Curiously, this common national identity surfaced much earlier in Spanish America than in Spain.43

As was true in British America, intra-European creole identities were always changing and relational. As economic and political developments


threatened various Spanish American polities’ stability, French, German, and Portuguese communities arose. A wave of miners, soldiers, merchants, printers, and artisans from a variety of German cities arrived in the early sixteenth century in the Caribbean, Chile, Mexico, Río de la Plata, and Tierra Firme (present-day Venezuela and eighteenth-century New Granada) as German financiers—the Fuggers and Welsers—bankrolled Charles V’s election as Holy Roman Emperor and received concessions allowing them to settle territories from the Moluccas to Chile to Tierra Firme. The Welsers organized a virtual commercial monopoly in Venezuela around the extraction of pearls, precious metals, and stones, created a vicious pan-Caribbean trade of Amerindian slaves, and appointed ruthless governors with names such as Ehinger, Federman, Hohermuth, von Hutton, and Welser. When, however, Castilian conquistador-entrepreneurs such as Francisco Pizarro and Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada began to deliver the riches of vast highland civilizations to the Habsburgs, denying the Welsers the bounty they sought, rivalries emerged and a self-consciously Castilian party led by Jiménez de Quesada invented a narrative that contrasted the virtuous Castilian colonization of New Granada to the tyrannical German domination of Venezuela. Friar Pedro de Aguado portrayed Jiménez de Quesada’s colonization of Muisca as equivalent to the entrance of Joshua and the Israelites into the Promised Land—held in this case by Amerindian Canaanites—while he condemned the tyrannical German expeditions against virtuous Indians. Similarly, a threatening foreign community surfaced in Spanish America in the wake of the 1640 Portuguese war of secession from Spain. Powerful merchant communities that had thrived in Mexico and Peru since at least 1580 became the focus of targeted popular campaigns that cast them as potentially treasonous Portuguese conversos.44 Napoleon’s 1808 invasion of Spain elicited throughout the colonies patriotic movements that disowned recently appointed Spanish authorities as enemy French heretics.45 In each case emerging identities or

44 On the creation of a narrative of rapacious German colonization in opposition to a virtuous Castilian one, see Germán Arciniegas, “Los alemanes en la conquista de América,” 1941, in América, Tierra Firme y otros ensayos (Caracas, Venezuela, 1990), 155–310; Jaime Borja Humberto Gómez, Los indios medievales de Fray Pedro de Aguado: Construcción del idólatra y escritura de la historia en una crónica del siglo XVI (Bogota, Colombia, 2002); J. Michael Francis, Invading Colombia: Spanish Accounts of the Gonzalo Jiménez de Quesada Expedition of Conquest (University Park, Pa., 2007). On the emergence of a discourse of the Portuguese as Jews, see Jonathan I. Israel, Empires and Entrepots: The Dutch, the Spanish Monarchy and the Jews, 1585–1713 (London, 1990), 311–32.

45 To our knowledge no study of the initial stages of the Spanish American wars of independence has focused on the crusading anti-French ideologies that seem to have inspired the creation of the first urban juntas seeking autonomy (not independence) from the Catholic monarchy. For a sampling of the religious language, casting some Spanish authorities as “French heretics,” that inspired many of these juntas in New Granada, see Inés Quintero Montiel and Armando Martínez Garnica, Actas de formación
established identities that were weakening became stronger when political or cultural leaders created and targeted dangerous national internal enemies. Current scholarship sheds less light on the perceptions of members of these foreign communities.

But if supposedly threatening internal foes were sometimes coded as foreigners and excluded from the category Spaniards, that category was far from pure, even when working according to its own definitions. In Spanish America whiteness was not solely defined racially. Peninsular Spaniards were those capable of proving old-Christian bloodlines, and Judaism and Islam were increasingly seen as threatening heretical religions that could be passed down secretly by parents and grandparents within households. Thus Christianized Jews and Muslims were considered unreliable and potential heretics. Yet despite this racializing impulse, *conversos* and *moriscos* often found a way to establish their old-Christian blood by forging documents and mobilizing neighbors and patrons willing to testify on their behalf in legal inquiries called *provanzas*. In Spanish America patronage networks and good standing within the community also trumped notions of race. In the New World, there were also Jewish, *converso*, and *morisco* bloodlines, but the main threat to old-Christian identities came from Africans and Native Americans who constituted a majority of the population. They could be more easily identified than *moriscos* and *conversos*, but Spanish identity was ultimately defined less through any visual test of difference than through the testimony of neighbors and patrons. Though the discourse of purity of blood assumed innate racial predispositions, Africans, *conversos*, Indians, and *moriscos* could use patronage networks and economic success to erase African, Amerindian, Jewish, or Moorish ancestries. Demonstrating high social standing in the community that attested to one’s *calidad* was often enough for *conversos*, *moriscos*, and Indians to be considered old Christians. In the case of blacks and mulattoes, they could even legally prove to be white. This type of ethnogenesis took place mostly in Spanish American cities and cut both ways: it let some Indians and Africans become Spaniards while it was instrumental in allowing whites to incorporate outsiders. Paradoxically, this peculiar ethnogenesis, by tracking degrees of religious contamination in Christian bloodlines through a calculus of purity, led to the development of a whole new category of peoples: the mestizos, who, despite resisting being pigeonholed into any of the forty different *castas*, acquired a distinctive urban, plebeian identity.46


*de juntas y declaraciones de independencia* (1809–1822): *Reales Audiencias de Quito, Caracas y Santa Fè* (Bogota, Colombia, 2007).
Similar processes were occurring within Europe itself. Many national identities were crafted in the crucible of the Atlantic expansion. Alison Games has shown that “English Cosmopolitans”—perhaps Atlantic cosmopolitans should replace Atlantic creoles to describe similar kinds of people living on the African littoral—were crucial forgers of what later became the British Empire. The English developed common Protestant and national identities as they sought to build an empire to counter expanding Catholic Spanish and French monarchies. The effect of similar processes in the Netherlands has also been well documented. In fact European ethnogenesis in relationship to the Atlantic has yet to be fully explored. Doing so will entail charting the ways those who remained in the Old World adapted to the disruptive forces that pushed many to the New World, whether by relocating within Europe or by adapting to changing conditions without moving. The Atlantic permeated the continent in surprising and myriad ways. For example, as he lost the right of succession to the Spanish monarchy to the French Bourbons, Habsburg Archduke Charles of Austria (Charles VI of the Holy Roman Empire and failed Charles III of Spain) sought to re-create his lost Indian empire within central Europe. Under Charles, the Holy Roman Empire came to have viceroys, *casta* paintings, and hard-to-convert Indian peasants. This admittedly extreme example underscores the fallacy of assuming, as Americanists of all stripes occasionally do, that European immigrants arrived in the New World carrying stable and static identities.

If, however, different European peoples were coming together in different constellations—if ethnogenesis was occurring among white

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people in Europe and the Americas—it was not happening in the same way everywhere. National identities in the European core coalesced, but only partially and unevenly, from the more differentiated senses of identity that prevailed in the earlier age of composite monarchies. Provincial identities continued to trump latently national ones throughout the Americas well into the nineteenth century, though the dialectic between them shaped the development of a federal republic in Anglophone North America while producing the tension between Hispanic consciousness and city-state creole patriotisms throughout Spanish America. Economic transformations and large-scale voluntary migration disembedded many Europeans, forcing or allowing them to build new senses of local, religious, national, and racial identity, and these identities varied depending on a host of contingencies. One can find some who embraced escape from the comfort offered and the limitations imposed by reembedding themselves—mariners who opted to become pirates, or European freedmen who chose to remain in the Barbary States without converting to Islam after winning freedom—but most sought to find places in new communities and adapted to the communities they joined.

In a discussion of indigenous Americans and the Atlantic world, Amy Turner Bushnell has highlighted some of the interpretive costs associated with the too-often unselfconscious Eurocentrism of Atlantic history. She points out that many indigenous peoples lived on the peripheries of Atlantic encounters and economies long after 1492 (with the important

49 Canada and Brazil do not fit neatly into this formulation. Brazil certainly experienced regional—what we are calling city-state patriotic—uprisings, but the movement of the Portuguese Crown to Brazil in the nineteenth century helped blunt their appeal. Much of Canada’s sparse population included loyalist refugees from the United States, pushing its political development along different lines, but the continuing interest of some in the United States in liberating Canada suggests that the differences, though real, can be overstated. See Cassandra Pybus and Hamish Maxwell-Stewart, American Citizens, British Slaves: Yankee Political Prisoners in an Australian Penal Colony, 1839–1850 (Melbourne, Australia, 2002), chaps. 1–4.

exception of the demographic and epidemiological costs of contact). Seeing the histories of American peoples through the lens of the Atlantic relegates these peoples and their experiences to the margins.  

Given the role of Europeans’ initiative in creating the exchanges that produced what historians have come to call the Atlantic world, it may be impossible to escape some privileging of Europe in Atlantic histories, and it may be undesirable as well. A key challenge for those who want to address historical questions that arise out of the contacts among the early modern peoples of Africa, America, and Europe will be how to acknowledge the role of European expansion in creating an Atlantic world without allowing the historical experiences of Europeans to become the normative standard against which judgments about Atlantic peoples and their histories are made. We have sought to avoid making the European normative by examining processes that were remarkably pan-Atlantic and panhemispheric and by viewing them from an analytic perspective influenced most deeply by cultural studies of African and American peoples. Though we have not compared the early modern Atlantic with other times and places, it seems to occupy an important place in the accelerating pace of cultural mixing that has produced new and often competing senses of identity in the modern world. If that is true, then it is the cultural fluidity and adaptability exhibited by all Atlantic peoples, but especially through the resistance to European power on the part of African and Amerindian peoples, which have done as much to shape the world of increasingly porous borders as the constitutional or mercantile innovations that often receive more attention.  


52 Highlighting the importance of cultural change is not meant to deny the importance of legal and constitutional or commercial developments. For essays examining those issues within the framework of British imperial history while paying attention to excluded groups, see Jack P. Greene, ed., Exclusionary Empire: English Liberty Overseas, 1600–1900 (New York, 2010).