To clarify the goals of teaching history in the schools, we begin by presenting three scenarios involving young people’s encounters with history outside of school.

For entertainment, two teenaged friends go to a film dealing with a historical topic, perhaps Pearl Harbor. They are swept into the cinematic portrayal and emerge at the end, one saying to the other, “How could people have thought that way back then?”

A family from eastern Canada visits Victoria’s Royal British Columbia Museum. Walking through the “school” in a reconstruction of a turn-of-the-twentieth century mining town, the parents encourage the ten- and twelve-year-olds to imagine what it must have been like for settlers in early British Columbia. “I’m glad I didn’t have to go to that school,” says one.

A thirteen-year-old girl, reading Karen Cushman’s Catherine, Called Birdy, a fictional novel about a girl in thirteenth-century England, exclames to herself, with a shock of recognition, “She feels exactly the way I do about being cooped up by my parents!”

Historical film, historical reconstructions, and historical fiction are all designed to sweep their audiences into an apparent past. When successful, the audiences imagine, as do the people mentioned above, that they are experiencing history as historical actors experienced it, that they have a direct window into what the past looked like, felt like, and what it meant. How can school history possibly compete with these media?

In this chapter, we will argue that school history has a different objective, and that it should come at history from an entirely different angle. While these genres aim to sweep students in, school history should provide students with the ability to approach historical narratives critically—precisely not to be “swept in.” That is, a good history curriculum would prompt students to ask of cinematic and fictional accounts of the past, as well as their textbooks’ and teachers’ accounts, who constructed this account and why? What sources did they use? What other accounts are there of the same events or lives? How and why do they differ? Which should we believe?

The ability to confront historical accounts critically, however, is not all that should be aimed for in the school history curriculum. On the positive side, students need also to begin to be able to offer accounts of the past that they have good reason to believe. This is an enormously complex process, of course, and some readers will stop right here and say, “Leave that to the historians! We’re lucky if students even learn a few historical facts.” We would argue, however, that young people do have images of the past in their minds, and that in their more thoughtful moments they do sporadically, incompletely, and often inaccurately, attempt to figure out what the past might mean for them and for their futures. The job of history education is to work with

* Carla Peck revised the original version of this chapter, written by Peter Seixas for Trends and Issues in Canadian Social Studies.
these fragments of thinking and develop them so that students have a better basis upon which to make sense of their own lives. That is, we need to teach students to think historically. In part because history in Canada is taught largely within the context of social studies, we have done all too little thinking about what "thinking historically" really means.²

Consider the following two quotes, which seem, on first glance, to be pointed in two diametrically opposite directions:

*The past is never dead, it's not even past.*
—William Faulkner³

*The past is a foreign country: they do things differently there.*—L.P. Hartley⁴

What might these quotations tell us about how to think about our relationship to the past? Faulkner points to the fact that the past suffuses every part of our lives; it is embodied in our streets, buildings, our schools, our personalities, our government, and our ideas. Indeed, it is embodied in our own bodies; our civilization's scientific legacy was injected into my arm in the form of a tetanus shot yesterday. A hernia scar is a legacy of the relatively recent past, while my genetic inheritance is the legacy of generations. The past shapes everything we are, everything we do. The past is, as Faulkner said, not even past.

On the other hand, as Hartley reminds us, the past is "a foreign country." The past may be so different, that it's different in ways that we don't even imagine. Not only did people experience a radically different external world, but the whole structure of their feelings and thoughts was different. Their reasons for doing things were radically different from our own. At every step of the way, then, as we try to know the past, we need to ask ourselves whether we are anachronistically imposing our own frameworks of meaning upon people from another time.

If Faulkner is right, then we need to know a lot about the past to know who we are (individually and collectively) in any deep way. If Hartley is right, then finding out about the past is no easy matter. We think they are both right. Taken together, they show us how big and important and difficult a problem it is to think historically. Perhaps the only thing that is more difficult is to teach students to do so.

Basically, we have two ways of knowing about the past: traces and accounts. (We believe “traces” and “accounts” capture the important differences more clearly and comprehensively than the more commonly used “primary” and “secondary” sources.) Both are problematic for reasons that we will explain.

Traces include documents both official and public (such as the British North America Act) and unofficial and private (such as a teenager's journal entry). They also include relics, such as the *Enola Gay*, the plane now lodged in the Smithsonian Museum in Washington, DC, which dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. Traces cannot be read simply or directly. They don't tell us what happened in so many words. They must be contextualized and analyzed. We use them as bases for inferences. They offer only a starting point to reconstruct what happened and why and what it all means. Furthermore, they change over time. The meanings of words in documents change over time, often in subtle and slippery ways. Physical artifacts decay, unless they are preserved or restored. But then the preservation and restoration become traces of a later period, embedded with ideas about how we think things should have looked or felt. Furthermore, artifacts can mislead us, if placed in contexts different from those of the lost worlds they once inhabited.

Accounts include narratives and explanations of what happened in the past. Storytellers, journalists, filmmakers, grandmothers, textbook writers and novelists—as well as historians—all create accounts of the past. Once again, we can't read them simply or directly. Unlike traces, they do tell us what happened in so many words, but we cannot necessarily believe them. They change over time, so that an account of the Northwest Rebellion written for Canadian school children in 1893 looks very different from one published in 2003.

Despite all of these problems, traces and accounts are all we have to work with as we try to know about the past, the past we need to know in order to know who we are. How do we do it? That is, what do we do when we think historically? In the next section of the chapter, we explore six problems that are central to historical thinking.⁵ These are all implicit in
Teaching Historical Thinking

the history lessons we present in school. But so much of history instruction is caught up in teaching "the facts" that we often let students fend for themselves in the crucial tasks of making sense of the information that we present. By defining the kind of sense-making that is particular to understanding the past, it becomes possible to make it an explicit part of history curriculum and assessment. Only then can we start to piece together the problem of what might count as advancement in historical thinking.

Elements of Historical Thinking

Significance

We can't teach everything that happened in the past, nor can a historian write about everything that happened in the past. In choosing what to teach and what to write about, teachers and researchers make distinctions between the historically significant and the historically trivial. Students, too, must be able to distinguish the significant from the trivial. But what makes an event or a trend or a person historically significant? The answer is not straightforward. In confronting various fragmentary historical traces and accounts, we undertake a process of sifting and drawing of relationships to make sense of the past. But what kind of relationships do we draw? Significant events and people may be those that have the greatest impact on people and our environment over the longest period of time. Thus World War I, the French Revolution, and the great political, economic, and military leaders would count as the most significant. But, by these criteria, the entire corpus of social history, "history from the bottom up," women's history, and labour history, which have occupied the bulk of professional historians' time and energy over the past thirty years, might be discounted as trivial. Such criteria would not allow much time for the study of as sparsely populated a country as Canada, let alone the regional or local histories that command the focus of historians, teachers, and students.

Clearly these criteria, alone, are not adequate. "Significance" is about a relationship not only among events and people of the past, but also about the relationship of those events and people to us, in the present, who are doing the historical thinking. Defining historical significance involves organizing events in a narrative that will show us something important about our position in the world. Like each of the elements of historical thinking, nobody can make much headway on historical significance if they do not already "know" a fair amount of history. On the other hand, "knowing" a lot of historical facts is useless without knowing how they fit together and why they might be important.

Epistemology and evidence

What accounts of the past should we believe, on what grounds, and with what reservations? When students read the historical novel, Copper Sunrise, how should they approach its portrayal of the end of the Beothuk? When they read their social studies textbook's account of the Riel Rebellion, should they have a different stance towards the things it says? When they hear a grandmother tell about her experiences in the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong, what should they believe? Public media are filled with conflicting historical accounts and interpretations of what they mean: Native land claims, the experiences of the inmates in residential schools, the role of Canadian soldiers and the Canadian air force in World War II, to name a few from Canadian history. Students need to develop abilities to assess these accounts and ask questions such as, "What are the problems with these accounts?" and "Shall I take them as is, or do they need revision?"

All of us rely selectively on the knowledge of experts, but young people's choices of which historical authorities to believe may be more or less warranted. They may rely uncritically on those whom they take to be experts, express generalized skepticism, or be able to articulate criteria for distinguishing reliable from unreliable authorities. Shortly after the film Dances with Wolves came out, I (Peter) interviewed a small sample of students after they watched several segments from it. They expressed a variety of reasons for believing the film's account of historical events: (1) the film's conformity to their understanding of human nature; (2) the familiarity of the
depiction of the historical characters; (3) the film's compatibility with school history accounts; (4) the fact that it was a recent film; (5) the technical sophistication of the film; and (6) the emotional impact of the film. Students need to learn which of these grounds are better to rely on than others.

Students also need to be able to use traces. At the most elementary level, students can read traces only directly as information, that is, without questioning authenticity or reliability. At a more advanced stage, students may learn to use the words of even an unreliable witness as a basis for inferences about thought, motivation, and action in the past.

Continuity and change
Understanding change over time is central to historical thinking. Yet such understanding also relies on certain assumptions of continuity. For instance, if we talk about religion changing over time, we assume a relatively constant conceptual category, religion, within which the change takes place. At a certain point, the change may be profound enough that the same category is no longer appropriate for naming the phenomenon we wish to describe.

The interaction between the concepts of change and continuity raises a host of problems for students' historical thinking. Even when they consider profound change in one aspect of social, political, or economic life, students may assume much more continuity in other aspects of life than is warranted. For instance, a student looking at the technological development of photography (an example of what the British call "development studies") may fail to consider related changes in the purposes of photography, in the availability of photographs and camera equipment, or in various peoples' modes of "reading" photographs. Highlighting any example of change in the foreground may inadvertently contribute to a set of ahistorical assumptions about the background to the change. Yet the more is brought into the changing foreground, the more complex the picture becomes.

Individuals' direct experience of historical change is relevant to their conceptualization of change and continuity. Age is clearly a significant factor in such experience. A sixty-year-old in twenty-first century North America has simply lived through more historical change than has a ten-year-old, and is likely to have more direct experience with how fundamentally things can change. But age is not the only factor in contributing to such historical experience. One's historical location is also significant. A person who lives through a war or a coup d'état, who experiences the ramifications of a technological innovation, who immigrates to a new country or who sees the impact of demographic change on a neighbourhood has a different experience of historical change from one who lives in traditional stability. Those who have lived through social instability may be more sensitive to the nuances of profound historical change. Teaching these nuances to students with diverse backgrounds requires attention to their different experiences.

Progress and decline
The issue of progress and decline adds an evaluative component to the issue of continuity and change. As things have changed, have they improved? They may do so in a number of different areas. Thus, we may speak of progress as technological, economic (in terms of standards of living), political (in terms of democratic participation and representation), moral (in terms of protection of human rights, or humane treatment more generally), environmental, scientific, spiritual, and so on. Each of these aspects of progress implies certain standards by which to evaluate change over time.

Most history textbooks (as well as most of the work of academic historians, until very recently) assume an underlying framework of historical progress. In Canadian history textbooks, a major component of progress is the development of Canadian constitutional autonomy. It is difficult to contemplate how one avoids nihilism and despair without some sense of the possibility of historical progress. Yet one need not look far in popular culture today to see that the idea of progress is under siege. Paul Kennedy coined the term "declinism" to describe the phenomenon. The New Yorker listed fourteen books published in the last two years whose titles take the form, "The End of __," including, among others, the future, education, reform, innocence, affluence, the victory
Teaching Historical Thinking

culture, and evolution. And they do not even include Francis Fukuyama’s widely discussed 1992 meditation on “the end of history.”

How do students orient themselves in what appears to be a complex moment in historical time? How does this orientation help to frame their historical knowledge, and conversely, how might historical knowledge help to orient them better? And what should we do with our progress-based history textbooks?

Empathy (historical perspective-taking) and moral judgement

People in the past not only lived in different circumstances (in terms of, for example, technology, shelter, and political institutions), but also experienced and interpreted the world through different belief systems. When students confront the differences of the past, however, they may naturally (and mistakenly) assume that people living in different circumstances nevertheless thought in ways essentially similar to themselves. The error of “presentism” is a failure to realize how much they don’t know about the past. Two aspects of our intellectual relationship with peoples different from ourselves are empathy and moral judgement.

Empathy, or historical perspective-taking, is not, in this context, an affective achievement. Rather, it is the ability to see and understand the world from a perspective not our own. In that sense, it requires “imagining” ourselves into the position of another. However—and this is crucial—that “imagining” must be based firmly on historical evidence if it is to have any meaning. Exercises that ask students to imagine being a medieval knight or a “fille du roi” make no sense unless they are based on a rich base of information about the fundamental structures and processes of everyday life during those times. Moreover, student writing and performance based on such exercises need to be assessed with an eye to anachronistic, presentist imposition of their own, twenty-first-century worldview upon the worlds of the past.

Paradoxically, this ahistorical presentism is sometimes used by historical novelists, filmmakers, and, alas, history teachers. These architects of historical accounts may attempt to make their characters “come alive” for their contemporary audiences by giving them familiar behaviours, motivations, assumptions, and conventions from their own culture. The resulting anachronisms are pervasive in the popular media. Thus after watching Native people discuss how to handle the white intruder in Dances with Wolves, one student said revealingly, “You get a sense that these are real people and they’re trying to deal with a real problem, as opposed to just a bunch of Indians.” What made the film so “real” for him? “I could see very easily a bunch of white people talking about almost exactly the same thing...” The power of the film came, then, from rendering Natives of 1863 familiar, like “white people” today. This student responded “empathetically” to the historical account that presented the “other” as fundamentally like himself. After all, we “understand” someone’s actions if we believe that, facing similar circumstances, we would do the same. The paradox of empathy, then, is that it involves an effort to confront difference, which, at every turn, tempts us to impose our own frameworks of meaning on others.

Moral judgements in history pose similar kinds of problems. We make judgements by understanding historical actors as agents who faced decisions, sometimes individually, sometimes collectively, which had ethical consequences. Moral judgements require empathetic understanding, that is, an understanding of the differences between our moral universe and theirs, lest they be anachronistic impositions of our own standards upon the past. That having been said, meaningful history cannot entertain a relativism that disallows our condemnation of brutal slave-holders, enthusiastic Nazis, and marauding conquistadors. Exactly as with the problem of historical empathy, our ability to make moral judgements in history requires that we entertain the notion of an historically transcendent human commonality, a recognition of our humanity in the person of historical actors, at the same time that we open every door to the possibility that those actors differ from us in ways so profound that we perpetually risk misunderstanding them.

Historical agency

The problem of historical agency is a way of think-
ing about historical causation. The concept of agency, however, focuses the historian on relationships of power. Who makes historical change, and in what ways are their efforts constrained by the social, political, and economic structures in which they find themselves? Historian Jill Ker Conway describes her own "passion to understand the deterministic forces which constrained human freedom of the will." She continues, "I'd seen those deterministic forces overwhelm my rural family, and needed to understand for myself to what extent human action is free."19

In the past thirty years, historians have sought ways to understand the historical agency of relatively powerless groups. Labour historians, women's historians, and other social historians have attempted to take their subjects out of the textbook "sidebars" into the centre of history, and not simply as victims. How did they actively shape their lives, their cultures, and the course of history, as they operated within the constraints of their social and historical positions?

To what extent do young people have such a democratic sense of historical causation? How do they view their own relationship to social change? Do accounts of the past in which significance is located only among elites have an impact upon students' own sense of agency? Some of the most virulent arguments about history curriculum have involved assertions about the psychological impact of history on marginalized groups. Proponents of women's, ethnic, and working-class history claim, plausibly, that their histories would offer students a chance to see themselves as active forces for historical change; opponents, of course, may fear exactly that. How young people in a variety of social and historical situations understand their own life activity as a part of historical change is, then, an important consideration in thinking about the way we present the past.

Some Comments on Recent Research

As Ken Osborne has shown, there is a long history of Canadian debates about historical thinking in the history curriculum.10 But a significant new body of history education research has accumulated over the past decade, exploring how students work with these problems. In many respects, it has the characteristics of any young field of research: it is vibrant, changes quickly, and still has much room for growth. Key texts in the field include the three volumes of the *International Review of History Education*;11 the collection edited by Peter Stearns, Peter Seixas, and Sam Wineburg, entitled, *Knowing, Teaching and Learning History: National and International Perspectives*;12 Sam Wineburg's *Historical Thinking and Other Unnatural Acts: Charting the Future of Teaching the Past,*13 and Linda Levstik and Keith Barton's *Doing History: Investigating with Children in Elementary and Middle Schools.*14

Recent research on students' understanding of historical significance is, for the most part, concerned with how and why students ascribe significance to particular people and/or events from the past.15 Students from varying ethnic groups and/or social contexts have been shown to understand historical significance in differing ways. Research on students' use of and ways of thinking about historical evidence has produced fairly consistent findings.16 Perhaps the single most important conclusion is that the claim that young children are unable to work with evidence to construe a picture of the past appears to be untrue. Nevertheless, students' ability to work with evidence does not come naturally: it develops as an outcome of systematic teaching. Barton's work and that of Foster and Yeager also indicate that students are more adept at working with evidence orally, as opposed to providing written accounts.17 Barton has conducted much of the recent, albeit limited, research on students' understanding of continuity and change. In a comparative study involving students from the United States and Northern Ireland, Barton found that students' understanding of historical change differed significantly.18 These differences, moreover, were strongly tied to differences in curriculum, and were rooted in deep differences between social, cultural and political contexts. Whereas American children tended to describe change as a story of their nation's progress; attributable to canonical individuals in their society, children in Northern Ireland tended "to describe change
in terms of societal institutions and group processes.” Den Heyer found that American students generally linked agency and progress, and located the sources of historical change in “great men” (and sometimes women) who saw something wrong within their society and decided to make a change, rather than in social movements. Again, national context and social location may account for variation in these ideas.

Peter Lee and Ros Ashby, building on a long tradition of British history education research, found that many students relied on “deficit theories” — that people from the past simply were not smart enough or did not know enough to act differently or to choose a different course of action — to explain the actions of people from the past. There were glimpses of hope on issues of historical empathy, however. Some of the second-graders “behaved as if they believed that even puzzling institutions like the ones in the tasks could be made intelligible by understanding how people saw their world.” While this type of thinking was more typical of older students, the authors advise “how mistaken it would be for teachers to have low expectations of younger children.”

In the Classroom

If these issues and problems are as central to historical thinking as we argue, then they are probably already present, though perhaps submerged and unarticulated, in many of the best history classrooms. This chapter can be seen as a contribution towards bringing them to the surface, towards making them a central part of our history teaching. In order to help that process, we offer the following questions and exercises as a starting point. They are not intended as lesson plans but as a way to start thinking about applying these ideas in the classroom. The bracketed suggestions are intended to serve as examples, and teachers may substitute alternative topics appropriate to their particular classrooms.

Significance

1. List four significant events in your own life. Why did you choose these? Write an autobiography using only these events and transitions between them. Now list four different significant events from your life. Write another autobiography using only these four and transitions among them. How are the two stories of your life similar? How are they different?

2. Draw a diagram showing the most significant events in your family’s history from [the birth of your grandparents] to [the present]. Why did you choose these? Ask another member of your family to do the same exercise. How are they different?

3. Make a poster showing four significant events in the history of Canada. Be prepared to defend your choice of events to the class.

Epistemology and evidence

1. Examine a historical artifact. What do you think this is? What makes you say so?

2. What do you think [the artist, the photographer] wanted people to think when s/he [painted, took] this picture? How do you know?

3. How could we find out about what it was like in [schools 100 years ago]?

4. Which of these sources best shows how [radicals] were thinking about [the Family Compact] in [1837]?

5. What seems to be the director’s purpose in the film [Black Robe, 1492, The Ballad of Crowfoot]? How did that purpose shape the story?

Continuity and change

1. Examine two or more photographs of the same street scene from different eras. What has changed? What has remained the same?

2. Examine a historical artifact. Why is this no longer in use? What do we use now instead? How does the change make our lives different?

3. Arrange the following [quotations, pictures, etc.]
in the order of the dates when they occurred. Explain why you ordered them in this way.

4. Conduct a development study of particular topics, for example, clothing, transportation, health, war, schooling. Different groups of students can research different topics and compare rates of change, progress (see below), causes of, and impediments to change.

Progress and decline

1. Have things progressed (i.e., improved) since the time [pictured, written about] here? In what ways yes? In what ways no? For whom?

2. Do you think things were better when [children were strictly disciplined; monarchs had absolute power]? Why?

3. How did the changes in [child labour laws] improve the lives of [children]?

Empathy (historical perspective-taking) and moral judgement

1. What did the author of this document think about [slavery]?

2. Write a response to [the coming of the railroad] from the perspective of [the Blackfoot].

3. How were the beliefs of [the Catholic clergy in New France] different from our own?

Historical agency

1. Which groups of people [have been/are/will be] most responsible for bringing about [equal political rights/social equality/economic security]?

2. Have there been people who have changed many other people's lives? Who? How?

3. What conditions helped [Nellie McClung] make a difference? What conditions made it harder for [Nellie McClung] to make a difference?

Conclusion

What we have proposed here is a radically different approach to history education than what is currently embedded in social studies curriculum documents. Thinking in social studies is too often defined in terms of generic “critical thinking” or “information processing” approaches. Following that line of reasoning leaves only “the facts” about the past as anything specifically historical. The argument here is that historical thinking involves certain distinct problems that cannot be collapsed into a more generic “critical thinking.” We have attempted to show that students’ social, political, and historical orientation requires confronting these problems. Students simply cannot get their bearings without grappling with these issues. Educators moan that too many social studies classrooms are dominated by rote memorization, mainly of historical facts. We have attempted here to define a richer vision of what students and teachers might strive towards.

Endnotes

2. However, see Thomas C. Holt, Thinking Historically: Narrative, Imagination, and Understanding (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1990).
Teaching Historical Thinking


17 Barton, "I Just Kinda Know": Foster and Yeager, "You've Got To Put Together the Pieces."


19 Ibid., p. 896.


23 Ibid.

24 Our thinking in these exercises has been shaped by Tim Lomas, *Teaching and Assessing Historical Understanding* (London: The Historical Association, 1990).