Who knows where the time goes?

Chris Lorenza* and Marek Tamm b

aInstitute for Social Movements, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany; bEstonian Institute of Humanities, Tallinn University, Tallinn, Estonia

In this interview Marek Tamm asks questions concerning some of the main developments in Chris Lorenz’ thinking about history over the last 25 years. The following topics are discussed: the necessity and function of theory in history, historical theory of Frank Ankersmit and Hayden White, relations between objectivism and relativism, between theories and facts, possibilities of truth and objectivity in history, perspectives of a scientific historiography, the change of temporal and spatial categories in contemporary historiography, distinctions between past, present and future, criticism of national history, prospects of comparative history and politics of time in the discipline of contemporary history.

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Tamm: You published recently an article about the relationship between history and theory over the last few decades. This is a good starting point to ask about your opinion on the necessity and function of theory in history. In the article you do not give a very enthusiastic description of the current situation, stating that ‘Theory in history has largely remained a specialization of a small number of philosophers and of “reflexive practitioners” of history’ (Lorenz 2011a, 17; cf. Lorenz 2001). While years earlier you have argued with good reason ‘that doing history is a more philosophical activity than most historians realize and that recognition of this fact can improve the scope and quality of historical discussion’ (Lorenz 1994, 297–298).

Lorenz: Well, actually I thought that was more or less stating the obvious. Most historians still do not subscribe to their disciplines need of ‘theory’, if I am not wholly mistaken. This is reflected in the near absence of professorships in this specialization. Moreover, due to the permanent saving policies in higher education since neoliberalism became hegemonic in politics, most of the few professorships that existed for instance in the Netherlands and in Germany have

*Corresponding author. Email: c.f.g.lorenz@vu.nl

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been skipped, or are under the threat of being skipped. The explanation is simple: the structural saving policy in education is implemented by applying the economic principle of enlargement of scale, which results in an increasing de-differentiation of specializations in disciplines. With every major budget cut, decisions have to be made about which specializations belong to the ‘core’ of the discipline and which to the ‘margin’. In this process of disciplinary contraction, ‘small’ specializations – and the philosophy and history of the discipline are usually small – are losing the institutional battles and as a consequence are disappearing. This does not only hold for the history departments, but also for law departments, for example. In this way the economics of higher education are conditioning the disciplinary conditions of ‘knowledge production’ – and thus their contents. In the humanities this structural process of de-differentiation is being cloaked behind the smokescreen of ‘interdisciplinarity’ – no longer meaning a space in between disciplines but a space without disciplines. This explains why I have had a long-term interest in higher education policies: in my view reflection on the general conditions of ‘knowledge production’ is – or at least: should be – part of the reflection of disciplinary ‘knowledge production’. Both are part of being a reflexive academic (see Lorenz 2006, 2008a, 2012).

But also apart from this process heads of history departments and the professional organizations of historians usually do not see theory as belonging to their ‘core business’. When Frank Ankersmit retired some years ago in Groningen, no successor was appointed, for example. The same story goes for the chair of Jörn Rüsen in Bielefeld – which had been Reinhart Koselleck’s chair before! – and I have no doubts the same story will apply in due time to my position in Amsterdam. Therefore, I think that on an institutional level theory of history will remain at best marginal. The same holds for historiography, which is often taught in combination with theory.

Luckily, there are also exceptions to this rule – at the University of Ghent, for instance, there is a remarkable group of young talented historians and philosophers around Berber Bevernage specialized in theory of history who have recently founded an international network (see http://www.inth.ugent.be). Also in Argentina and Brazil there are a couple of professorships in theory of history and there is a lively interest in theoretical issues. But apart from these exceptions, apparently most historians still think that the discipline of history can be practised without being historicized, nor being theorized. I do not agree with them at all – and I have argued my view for a long time – but I am well aware that I represent a minority opinion. This was already the case when I started my career (see Lorenz and Vries 1994). Nevertheless, I think the recent problems dealt with in theory – like ‘distance’, ‘presence’, ‘memory’ and ‘time’ – are of fundamental interest to all historians who take their practice seriously.

Tamm: Before starting writing articles on different aspects of historical theory (at least in English), you published in Dutch, in 1987, a quite voluminous introduction to the theory of history, entitled De constructie van het
verleden: Een inleiding in de theorie van de geschiedenis [Constructing the Past: An Introduction to the Theory of History] (Lorenz 1987). The book has had many revised editions in Dutch (nine in total) and was translated in 1997 into German (Lorenz 1997), and an English edition is in progress. In my opinion, this is one of the best introductions to the philosophy of history, even if slightly too extended, but one has to remark that this is a quite unusual way of proceeding: to offer first a synthesis, before moving on to analyses. How this book was born and in what extent your understanding of the historical theory has changed meanwhile (as reflected also in different editions)?

Lorenz: First I want to challenge your observation that my book Constructing the Past only represents a synthesis and is not a piece of analysis. In my opinion the book is carefully built up as a collection of analyses – predominantly of historical discussions, but also of philosophical issues and debates (mostly related to issues of epistemology and of philosophy of science and of social science, but also related to ethics and ontology).

As to the origins of the book: the bigger part of the book evolved out of my teaching practice and out of reflections on my teaching, mainly introductory and advanced courses in philosophy of history. This is also the reason why I have introduced all theoretical issues in the book by connecting them to actual discussions of historians and social scientists – which also explains why the book is lengthier than some other introductions. In my experience most students of history had no interest in theoretical problems per se – like causal and intentional explanation. The only way for me to convince them of the relevance of these problems for historians was to show how they manifest themselves in historical practice in general and in historical debates in particular. Therefore, the structure of this introduction is very discursive.

Of course you are right to observe that the contents of the book changed somewhat over time since 1987 due to new prints – so I have been so stupid to publish different books under the same book title. These changes reflected the changing topics under discussion in theory of history over time. Therefore, I have expanded the chapters of narrativity and on postmodernism in later editions, for instance.

At present I am working on what should be the final revision of the book, in which I have included John Searle’s theory of speech acts (Searle 1969). I think Searle’s analysis of the performativity of speech is of great importance for theory of history. I am also including more sections on issues related to the ‘memory boom’, like the ‘presence of the past’, ‘trauma’ and ‘silence’. Together with Berber Bevernage, I have just edited a volume in which we argued that the basic temporal distinctions of history – that is: of the distinction between the present, the past and the future – are the product of performative actions of historians (Bevernage and Lorenz 2013). I think we made a strong argument in favour of the performative deconstruction of the ‘chronological illusions’ of historians, but of course only the reviewers of this volume will decide whether we did this successfully or not.
Tamm: You entered the international scene of philosophy of history in the heydays of ‘linguistic turn’ and postmodernism, in late 1980s and early 1990s. But since the very beginning, you have adopted a rather critical stance vis-à-vis of this approach that you prefer to call ‘metaphorical narrativism’, represented by authors like Hayden White and Frank Ankersmit (see Lorenz 1998a, 1998b, 2004a). Between traditional positivistic objectivism and new postmodern relativism, you wanted to find a new path, a ‘third way’, that you labelled, following Hilary Putnam, ‘internal realism’ (Lorenz 1994). Could you summarize your epistemological position, conceptualized in early 1990s, and tell me also have you stayed faithful to this?

Lorenz: You are absolutely right about Frank Ankersmit and Hayden White being the most important points of reference in formulating my own position concerning the ‘linguistic turn’ and the issue of narrativism in history. They are because I think their work in this field is fundamental, meaning that they criticized unity of science ideas successfully and replaced them by a new agenda for the theory of history. However, although – or maybe: because – they have been ‘revolutionaries’ in a Kuhnian sense, their critical positions are heavily determined by the positions they criticize. I have argued in the introduction of my new book Bordercrossings: Explorations between Philosophy and History (Lorenz 2009a) that in some fundamental respects their own positions are ‘conceptual inversions’ of the positions they criticize. I will come back to this in a minute. So I see a dialectical mechanism in play here. I have tried to avoid this conceptual ‘trap’ myself in adopting ‘internal realism’, but I may be deluded, of course.

Recently, I have explained my own position in terms of a ‘double focus’, meaning a double line of argument: first arguments against relativism – in its classical and in its postmodern varieties – and, second, arguments against objectivism – in its classical empiricist and its positivistic varieties.1 Basically what I have been arguing is that both objectivism and relativism are philosophical legacies of empiricism and of positivism (cf. Bernstein 1983).

Let me first explain why I still regard objectivism – both in the form of empiricism (as an epistemological position) and of positivism (as a methodological position) – as a major problem in philosophy of history, because some could be tempted to regard this kind of criticism as meaningful as flogging a dead horse. Well, the horse of ‘objectivism’ is not quite as dead as it should be in my view because it is living on in various disguises. This leads me to the problem of conceptual inversion in philosophy of history. In the first part of my book Bordercrossings I argue that although empiricism and positivism have been declared ‘dead’ in philosophy of science at the latest since the 1970s, they still are very much alive in philosophy of history in inverted forms. ‘Post-foundationalism’ has not completely arrived in philosophy of history, so to speak, as also Aviezer Tucker (2004), Mark Bevir (2011), John Zammito (2011) and Paul Roth (2012) have recently been arguing. My argument for this thesis is the observation that quite a few problems that are still dealt with by philosophers of
history still presuppose the validity of some fundamental ideas of empiricism and of positivism.

Let me illustrate what I mean by one example – by a philosopher of history whose positions I have fundamentally criticized over a longer period of time and whose books have been translated in many languages: Frank Ankersmit. I have a great respect for this most systematic thinker of present-day philosophy of history (who also happened to be my second Doktorvater). From his dissertation Narrative Logic (Ankersmit 1983), over his Historical Representation (Ankersmit 2001), to his Sublime Historical Experience (Ankersmit 2005) and Meaning, Truth, and Reference in Historical Representation (Ankersmit 2012), he has been defending the same line of argument with a remarkable consistency. This is the argument that for a philosophical understanding of history writing the distinction between two kinds of linguistic entities is absolutely fundamental. This is the distinction between singular descriptive, referential statements – like ‘Josef Stalin died 5 March 1953 in Moscow’ and ‘Japan surrendered to the Allies on 2 September 1945 on the USS Missouri’ – which presuppose no theories and whose truth-value can be decided independent of other statements at the one side, and at the other side non-descriptive, non-referential complex linguistic entities, devoid of any truth-value. His standard examples of these complex linguistic entities are notions like ‘feudalism’, the ‘Enlightenment’ or the ‘Baroque’. Ankersmit has baptized these complex linguistic entities in the 1980s as ‘narrative substances’ and he later on – from the 1990s – has relabelled them as ‘historical representations’. Characteristic of these linguistic entities according to Ankersmit – and he has never got tired to emphasize this over and over again – is that they are devoid of any cognitive content of their own. Narrative substances and historical representations just generate points of view – or perspectives – from which we can look at the past, but they are not to be found in the past, nor do they refer to anything in the past. In short, narrative substances and historical representations cannot be ‘fixed’ to anything in the past. Therefore, according to Ankersmit, they only exist in a linguistic universe and are devoid of any truth-value. Much of what Ankersmit has written are inquiries into the logical nature of these cognitively ‘empty’ complex linguistic entities, which in his view function like substitutes of past reality. Given the unbroken continuity of his line of argument, it is not accidental that in an interview he has called his dissertation Narrative Logic his ‘best book’. Indeed it is, because it formulated the ‘agenda’ for the rest of his books for three decades.2

Now what I find fundamentally problematic in Ankersmit’s central line of argument is that the very opposition between a descriptive statement and a perspective – and therefore the opposition between individual descriptive statements in narratives and the complex ‘narrative substance’ they collectively generate – is taken over from empiricism without questioning.3 At stake is the idea that there is a fundamental opposition between proper names and individual descriptive statements – formerly known as Protokollsätze – which individually and directly refer to reality and whose reference can be ‘fixed’, at the one side,
and that there are sets of non-descriptive statements – in science usually known as ‘theories’ and in history as ‘narratives’ (or ‘narrative substances’ and ‘representations’) – whose reference to reality cannot be ‘fixed’. As is well known, empiricists have tried long and hard to construct the ‘fixes’ between the theories and the observation statements in (philosophy of) physics in the hope of ‘reducing’ theories to observational statements. This was the programme of logical positivism from the 1930s onwards. And, as we all also know too well, this project turned into one of the most interesting failures in the history of philosophy of science in the 1960s and 1970s. However, in conformity to this opposition deriving from empiricism, Ankersmit is still arguing that singular, descriptive statements can simply be ‘fixed’ to reality, while ‘narrative substances’ and ‘historical representations’ cannot be ‘fixed’ to reality.

So Ankersmit’s fundamental argument continues to be based on the empiricist idea that individual descriptive statements do not contain any perspectival element and that they can be ‘fixed’ – and thus somehow ‘founded’ – in observation. It is also based on the empiricist idea that without this referential ‘fixity’ statements have no cognitive content. The very idea of ‘fixing’ individual descriptive statements to (the experience of) reality, however, has been discredited effectively and definitively by post-empiricism and post-positivism – from Quine to Popper and Kuhn and beyond. This idea has been replaced by the insight in ‘the theory-ladenness of all empirical observation’. This insight has – remarkably – not been incorporated in Ankersmit’s original philosophy of history in 1983, and it has been explicitly rejected by him for history in his latest book of 2012.

This legacy of empiricism in Ankersmit is all the more remarkable since he has been dealing with both Quine and Popper directly. Nevertheless, he has been rejecting the very idea of the ‘theory-ladenness’ of descriptive statements in history explicitly from *Narrative Logic* to *Meaning, Truth, and Reference*. And he does so for good philosophical, that is for systematic reasons. He does so, I must assume, because all of his fundamental conceptual distinctions – between description and representation, and between the ‘fixability’ of singular descriptive statements and the ‘non-fixability’ of narrative substances and representations – and as a consequence their respective *Wahrheitsfähigkeit* and *Wahrheitsunfähigkeit* – are depending on it. This is one important example of the continuing presence of ‘objectivism’ – that is both empiricism and positivism – in inverted forms in philosophy of history.

Another important example of ‘inverted empiricism’ can be found in some of the work of the other ‘grand old man’ in present-day philosophy of history, Hayden White. As with Ankersmit, my admiration for many of White’s achievements goes hand in hand with fundamental criticism. What I have been criticizing is what looks like an expulsion of epistemological questions and questions of explanatory logic from philosophy of history by White’s *Metahistory* (White 1973). This ‘expulsion’ is the consequence of limiting philosophy of history to philosophy of historical *writing*. By arguing that
preferences of historians for modes of emplotment etc. are conditioned only by aesthetic and ideological reasons and are unconnected to issues of epistemology, White in *Metahistory* did just the same thing that Ankersmit was doing by arguing that narrative substances are ‘autonomous’ from historical research and empty of any cognitive content. Therefore, I am basically arguing for a *balanced* approach to philosophy of history, including *both* the new questions that White and Ankersmit had put on the agenda concerning historical *writing*, and the old questions of epistemology and methodology concerning historical *research*. In other words, I am arguing against an either/or approach, and this time against the reduction of philosophy of history to philosophy of history writing because this reduction amounts to an ‘inversion’ of its former reduction to the philosophy of historical research by analytical philosophy. With authors like Jörn Rüsen (1983–1989), Allan Megill (Megill and McCloskey 1987), Anthony Grafton (1997), Thomas Mormann (1997) and Carlo Ginzburg (1999), I regard the *interconnections* between historical writing and historical research of constitutive importance for history as a cognitive enterprise – also limiting the ‘fictionality’ of history writing fundamentally.

This in no way implies a negative judgement on fictional and metaphorical ways of handling the past. To the contrary: elsewhere I have argued that authors of fiction usually have been much earlier than professional historians when it came to developing new forms and new contents in representing the past. This especially holds for ‘liminal’, ‘extreme’ experiences, so characteristic of the catastrophic twentieth century. Metaphors in historical research *and* writing in my view, however, should be analysed *both* as cognitive and as practical linguistic instruments (see Fermandois 2003). Remarkably, both Ankersmit and White (as far as I know) have not been analysing the practical dimensions of metaphor, although from a historical point of view this practical dimension is also present at the object-level. Just think of the practical dimensions – and the historical consequences – of representing specific individuals and groups in quasi-biological concepts as ‘Fremdkörper’ or ‘parasites’, or as ‘pests’ like cockroaches. In my view this ‘blind spot’ of narrativism represents another legacy of ‘objectivism’.

Neither does my argument imply that questions of narrativity can be reduced to questions of the logic of singular descriptive statements. To the contrary, in my view narratological approaches to history writing have been very fruitful in opening our eyes for the perspectives and the constructed patterns embedded in historical narratives. Maybe this is the moment to ‘confess’ that a recent volume that I have edited together with Stefan Berger is even based on narratological approaches of national histories (Berger and Lorenz 2010b). Therefore, my criticism of narrativism notwithstanding, it is hard to conceive of my recent work in historiography without it.

In my view – and similar views have been developed by authors like Aviezer Tucker (2004), Mark Bevir (2011), John Zammito (2011) and Paul Roth (2012) – in philosophy of history too we should *start* by rejecting the very idea of ‘fixing’
individual statements to reality. Instead, we should start by adopting the distinction introduced by Imre Lakatos (and already present in the thought of conventionalists like Henri Poincaré, Ludwig Fleck and Thomas Kuhn): the distinction between observational theories and explanatory theories (Lakatos 1978). We should stop to see this distinction as a binary opposition and start conceiving it as a sliding scale – as is also suggested by the history of science. When historians claim to give descriptions, they are actually presenting their observational theories, which are as fallible and as ‘unfixable’ as their explanatory theories. As a consequence, descriptions are as open to revision and to change as theories – as is amply demonstrated both by the history of science and by the history of historiography. So, together with Lakatos, Bevir and Tucker, I would argue that the distinction between ‘descriptions’ and ‘theories’ – and the latter also sail under the flags of ‘interpretations’ and ‘explanations’ – is a matter of degree and not of a kind. All ‘theories’ are underdetermined by the evidence – and this also holds both for ‘explanatory’ and for ‘observational’ theories. Therefore, I have positioned myself in a fundamental pluralist framework within which several ‘true’ descriptions and ‘true’ theories of ‘reality’ may coexist (like the wave and particle theories of light in physics or the theory of action and systems theory in the social sciences). And they may coexist peacefully or not – whatever is the case, pluralism is not the same as relativism. This is the practical meaning of what I have called – following Hillary Putnam – ‘internal realism’ (see Goodman 1978, 139–140; Rescher 1995). And I still stick to that position, although not necessarily to that label – now with the important proviso of Searle’s speech act theory, which states that social reality is constructed in a performative way (Searle 1995). Actually it is quite remarkable that neither White nor Ankersmit – as the ‘captains’ of the ‘linguistic turn’ in philosophy of history! – have taken systematically account of the linguistic constitution of historical reality.

As long as philosophers of history do not acknowledge the conventional character of both descriptions and theories, they keep paying tribute to what one could call the last dogma of empiricism: the epistemological privilege of factual over theoretical statements. In contrast, I am pleading – with among others Nelson Goodman – for an epistemological ‘equal treatment’ of theories and facts, based on the insight: ‘Facts are small theories and true theories are big facts’ (Goodman 1978, 6–7). For most historians and many philosophers of history, this insight still seems to be ‘a bridge too far’.

Since Quine, Kuhn and Lakatos, also philosophers of history better acknowledge that the basic problem in all disciplines is not the direct ‘fixity’ of theories to the world – or their lack of ‘fixity’ – but the ‘fit’ between (at least) two kinds of theories among each other. In my view this is one of the lasting and fundamental insights produced by the ‘linguistic turn’ and by ‘representationalism’. For those who (mistakenly I would say) suppose that ‘realism’ is dependent on the idea of a fixed relationship between language and the world, the ‘linguistic turn’ also means a final goodbye to ‘realism’.
Once we have put the problem of a direct ‘fixity’ of language to the world into the dustbin of empiricist philosophy – where it belongs – we should also realize that there are no sound reasons to think that narrative substances and representations are devoid of cognitive content because of their supposed lack of fixity. I have argued repeatedly that it is fruitful to regard the function and the cognitive content of narrative schemes in history as similar to the function and the cognitive content of explanatory theories in the sciences. This does, of course, not mean that I do not recognize also the enormous differences between explanatory theories and narrative schemes. The fact that explanatory theories in especially physics usually can be formalized and are expressed in the form of mathematical equations can hardly be overlooked, to give just the most obvious example of a difference.

So much for the problem of the legacies of objectivism in philosophy of history and my reasons for engaging them in some of my texts. Let me now point at the problematic legacies of relativism in philosophy of history, which will bring me to the second critical line of attack in my work.

Relativism is basically the philosophical double or Doppelgänger of objectivism. In whatever variety – and there are quite a few of them – relativists argue against some – or all – claims of objectivism. Relativists typically deny, or downplay, the epistemic claims of history by arguing that ‘the past’ is just ‘a construction of the present’, that doing history is therefore just another form of ‘politics’ or of ‘ideology’. The favourite targets of relativists therefore are the ideas that history can be ‘true’ and ‘objective’ in any meaningful sense. The same relativist point is made by those who argue that the selection and the development of historical narratives in time is completely independent of epistemological arguments and is only dependent on political or aesthetic preferences, as Hayden White famously did in *Metahistory*.

My critique of relativism in philosophy of history is in a fundamental sense the complement of my critique of objectivism. While objectivism is approaching historical knowledge only from the epistemic viewpoint of the – distant – observer, relativism is approaching historical knowledge only from the political viewpoint of the – involved – actor. In my view philosophy of history needs to include and analyse both the epistemological and the practical viewpoints, and we should avoid the reduction of our analysis of history to one of them. If we analyse historical knowledge only from the external observers viewpoint, philosophy of history will inevitably shrink to epistemological and methodological analyses. But if we analyse historical knowledge only from the political actor’s point of view – and this is the case when we view history exclusively as a form of practical action and historical theories as devoid of cognitive content – then philosophy of history will inevitably shrink to political and ethical analyses.

In my view philosophy of history worthy of the name therefore both needs to analyse the historical and the practical past in their interconnections and intersections. In this respect I always have been in fundamental agreement with Jörn Rüsen’s view of philosophy of history.
The most interesting insights in my view can be gained by analysing exactly the intersections of the epistemology and the politics of history – and in this domain I have drawn some inspiration from both Pierre Bourdieu and of Michel Foucault – whose ideas have also been very fruitful in my analyses of the conditions of academic knowledge production (Lorenz 2008a, 2012). I have tried to do this by analysing the politics of historians and their politics of comparison in a couple of historiographical controversies, like the ‘Historikerstreit’, the Goldhagen-debate, the Holocaust-debate, the debate about the Second German Empire and the debate about the national identity of Canada/Quebec (Lorenz 1994, 1995, 2002a, 2002b, 2010a). I have argued in these analyses that basic political options of historians are usually hidden in their choice of ‘contrast classes’ of the cases they use implicitly or explicitly in comparisons. So my basic interest can be located on a terrain one could call the politics of method. Whether this approach to philosophy and to historiography is worth its while is not for me to decide (for the most recent examples, see Lorenz 2010a, 2010b).

Tamm: One crucial question, especially in the debate between ‘objectivism’ and ‘relativism’, is of course the question about the status of truth and objectivity in history writing. You have argued strongly in favour of these concepts, for instance in an article published in 1999, “‘You Got Your History, I Got Mine”: Some Reflections on the Possibility of Truth and Objectivity in History’ (Lorenz 1999b). Would you accept to revisit this text almost 15 years later: how do you see now the possibility of truth and objectivity in history?

Lorenz: My article on objectivity and truth in history of 1999 is clearly a ‘dialogue’ – albeit a pretty polemical dialogue – with postmodern conceptions of history which had been spreading for some time in the 1980s and 1990s and which argued that history was nothing more than an ‘ideology’. You are absolutely right about that. My point back then was that we cannot make sense of ‘doing history’ without presupposing some notion of truth and objectivity – meaning some notion of representational adequacy, that is essentially relative and comparative in nature because the only thing you can compare representations to are other representations (just as is the case with scientific theories). Therefore, ‘objectivity’ as a regulative idea must always be conceived of in terms of the comparative quality of one representation over others – so much is the lasting insight of philosophy of science too. I still subscribe to that position and analysis although I have always been aware that it may be extremely difficult to make reasoned claims about relative ‘objectivity’ in historical and historiographical practice. Nevertheless, I think this is what is fundamentally at stake in most of the interesting historical discussions: historians trying to establish the comparative pros and cons of historical representations and trying to draw a comparative ‘balance sheet’. The fact that they rarely agree with each other does not alter this regulative idea.

Historians in contrast to writers of fiction are claiming – as historians – that their representations are ‘truthful’ in some sense – that is their professional
‘contract’ with their readers. I think with literary theorists like Matías Martínez that the distinction between factual and fictional genres cannot be established in terms of textual characteristics and must be conceived of in terms of a ‘contract’ between the author and the reader. This contract can also be breached by the author, as is the case with for instance Holocaust-deniers and with phoney autobiographers like Binjamin Wilkomirski (alias Bruno Dösseler) (see Langer 2006). Holocaust-deniers and authors who publish ‘untrue’ autobiographies do not produce ‘fictional texts’ but fake ‘historical’ ones. And ‘fake history’ is not the same as fiction – I think this is an important distinction that has to be used in the discussion on the ‘narrativity’ of history.

Tamm: You have sometimes pondered on the question in what sense can one speak about ‘historical science’ or ‘scientific historiography’, suggesting that a scientific historiography is possible, indeed, if considered as a ‘cognitive enterprise, based on epistemology and on comparative methodology’ (Lorenz 2009b, 402; cf. Lorenz 2008b). Even though I do not want to raise an old question again: is historiography art or science? (White 2000), I would still like to ask what value do you attribute to the fact that after no matter how meticulous and erudite research, the historian has to turn towards literary tools like narrativization and metaphorization in order to produce new knowledge?

Lorenz: I hope I answered that question earlier on, as my answer to your third question. As all representations – both scientific theories and historical narratives – are underdetermined by the evidence they refer to, their relative cognitive quality can only be established by means of comparison among each other. Therefore, in my view the whole idea that ‘doing history’ consists of producing a relatively incontestable kernel of ‘factual’ statements, based of archival research, which must ‘transformed’ by ‘metaphorical processing’ in a narrative synthesis that is contestable, is wrong. Both factual statements and narratives are contestable from the very beginning to the very end. I think that in the end the ‘art or science?’ question is based on the last dogma of empiricism, that is the idea of the priority of factual over theoretical statements, and that this dogma has created a false dilemma.

Tamm: You have recently written: ‘Since 1989, the past is no longer what it used to be, and neither is the academic study of the past’ (Lorenz 2010b, 67). More specifically, you have argued that both temporal and spatial categories in history have undergone a major transformation. To start with the first, changes in temporal categories, you admit that ‘the “pastness of the past” (which had been the constitutive presupposition of academic history since the French revolution) and the capacity of academic history to explain how the past is connected to the present, suddenly lost their “evidential” quality’ (Lorenz 2010b, 68). The historians are confronted since 1989 ‘with a “haunting” past instead of with a – distant – “historical” past’. Your own research has been dedicated in recent years very much to this new situation, that you describe as ‘unstuck in time’ (Lorenz 2010b, 68), you are interested how cultures in general and historians in particular distinguish ‘the past’ from ‘the present’ and ‘the future’, and how their
interrelationships are constructed (Bevernage and Lorenz 2013; cf. Lorenz 2011b). Would you like to summarize your research in this field?

**Lorenz:** Let me start with emphasizing that although time had already become a topic of interest to me (Lorenz 2007), before Berber Bevernage contacted me in 2007, our contact has been very important in developing my further interest and points of view in case. Accidentally, it matched perfectly with my renewed interest in John Searle’s ideas about performative speech acts and we applied this idea to temporal distinctions as well. Now what is the problem in case? Let me tell you what Berber and I have argued in the introduction of our recent volume *Breaking Up Time* (2013).

Historians have long acknowledged that time is essential to historiography. Many historians have also recognized the importance of the distinction between different temporal scales and rhythms – think of Fernand Braudel and Reinhart Koselleck, for example. Surprisingly, however, very few have investigated the subject of historical time in depth. Symptomatically, in Aviezer Tucker’s recent *Companion to the Philosophy of History and Historiography* (Tucker 2009), time is not dealt with as a topic – it is even lacking in the index.

At least this was the case until recently. In the last couple of years, a number of historians and philosophers have addressed the problem of historical time in an increasingly sophisticated way. Following in the footsteps of Koselleck, several historians – in particular Lucian Hölscher (1999), François Hartog (2003) and Peter Fritzsche (2004) – have started historicizing time-conceptions previously taken for granted. In philosophy of history, the relationship between past and present recently moved centre stage in debates about ‘presence’, ‘distance’, ‘trauma’, ‘historical experience’, etc. Independently, postcolonial theorists and anthropologists have added momentum to the growing interest in time by deconstructing the ‘time of history’ as specifically ‘Western’ time.

Three issues concerning time seem especially pertinent and urgent. First there is the question you already quoted, that is the question how cultures in general and historians in particular distinguish ‘past’ from ‘present’ and ‘future’. How do they construct the interrelationships between these temporal dimensions? Although since the ‘birth of modernity’ history presupposes the existence of ‘the past’ as its object, ‘the past’ and the nature of the borders that separate ‘the past’, ‘the present’ and ‘the future’ until very recently have attracted little reflection within the discipline of history. Ironically, historians and philosophers of history can hardly claim to have substantial knowledge of how ‘present’ social and cultural phenomena turn into (or come to be perceived as) past phenomena. The ‘omission’ of this subject of research is remarkable because cultures and societies have fixed, and still do fix, the boundaries between past, present and future in quite different ways. Moreover, these differences also vary depending on the context in which this distinction is made. In the modern West, for instance, legal time functions differently from historical time and both are different from religious time.
It has been argued that cultures also have different dominant orientations in time. ‘Traditional’ cultures are generally supposed to be characterized by a dominant (political, ethical, cultural, etc.) orientation to the past, while ‘modern’ cultures characteristically have a dominant future-orientation. ‘Postmodern’ cultures, however, are supposedly characterized by a dominant orientation towards the present. Yet, how these temporal orientations have changed – and whether they simply succeed each other or coexist – has not been analysed in depth. It is symptomatic that François Hartog’s (2003) thesis that Western thinking about history is characterized by a succession of three ‘regimes of historicity’ – from a past-orientation until the French Revolution, to a future-orientation until the 1980s, and then a present-orientation in the years since – has hardly been empirically tested. Therefore, the questions about the unity, the dominance, the spatial extensions, the transfers and the transformations of ‘time regimes’ (are there no competing or overlapping ‘sub-regimes’?) are badly in need of further conceptual and empirical analysis.

Second, scholars of historical time generally pay little attention to the ‘performative’ character of temporal distinctions. Usually ‘the past’ is somehow supposed to ‘break off’ from ‘the present’ on its own, by its growing temporal distance or increasing ‘weight’ – like an icicle. Although few probably would hold that temporal distinctions are directly and unambiguously ‘given’, even fewer have paid attention to the ways in which the distinguishing of the three temporal modes can be analysed as a form of social action connected to specific social actors.

This question of the historian as (social or political) actor has recently figured prominently in the debate on so-called ‘commissioned history’ as it manifests itself in, for example, the work of government-appointed historical commissions and truth commissions – a topic Berber has analysed in depth in his path-breaking dissertation (Bevernage 2012). Yet the issue in this case is of a more general and fundamental nature. It belongs to those characteristics of ‘doing history’ that have traditionally been repressed. Even when all appearances are against them, professional historians traditionally claim to occupy (or to strive after) the position of the distant, impartial observer and not the position of the acting participant. The notion of an ever-increasing temporal ‘distance’ as automatically breaking up past and present has been of central importance for safeguarding this distinction between the ‘involved’ actor and the ‘impartial’ observer.

A third issue concerning time, which is directly connected to the previous one, concerns the political nature of the borders that separate these temporal dimensions. François Hartog (2003) has rightly argued that terms such as ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ are invariably invested with different values in different regimes of historicity. When taken to its logical conclusions, this observation suggests that historians must ask whether historical time is a neutral medium or whether it is in fact inherently ethical and political. I think we should ask whether historians too engage in a ‘politics of time’, as the anthropologist Johannes
Fabian (1983) and the philosopher Peter Osborne (1995) have held to be the case in their respective disciplines. It is about time to start scrutinizing how these politics of historical time function in historical practice – and I will do so in my Bochum-project in the coming two years – and to analyse the assumptions concerning the ‘past-ness’ of the past and the ‘present-ness’ of the present of historians. Especially in the discussions about ‘collective memory’ and about the differences between ‘memory’ and ‘history’, these assumptions are of crucial importance, it seems to me.

Tamm: The second major transformation in our relations with the past and in academic historical research is spatial in nature. You argue that one of the constitutive presuppositions of history since the early nineteenth century, that the nation and the nation-state were the fundamental subjects of history, has lost its plausibility, ‘as if there was a sudden consciousness that the mass killings of the twentieth century had been caused by nationalisms run wild’. Critical history of national history writing has been one of your major fields of study during the recent decade or so (see Berger and Lorenz 2006, 2010a, 2010b; Berger, Lorenz, and Melman 2012). Would you briefly characterize what are the main characteristics of national historiography, and do you believe that national history has, at least in Europe, no perspectives anymore?

Lorenz: I find it as intriguing as interesting that history as a discipline by and large has refrained from reflecting on what most historians claim to be its two constitutive characteristics: specificity and particularity as to time and space. What does this tell us about history and historians? And why did both constitutive characteristics become objects of serious reflection only very recently?

As you know, I have argued in several publications for my – and not only my – hypothesis that this is due to the recent questioning of the nation-state as the implicit spatial frame of reference of most history writing in the nineteenth and twentieth century. And as far as other than national frames of reference were in use – like empires or social classes, or the EU for that matter – they were and are being modelled after the nation-state – at least that is what I have been arguing together with historiographers like Georg Iggers, Daniel Woolf and Stefan Berger. For most historians of the nineteenth and twentieth century, identification with their state and nation (or ‘people’, ‘race’ and ‘tribes’, all of which were used as synonyms of ‘nation’) only seemed natural, because they identified the historical process itself with the genesis and development of nations and ‘their’ states. Through this (Herderian) identification, national history appeared as the adequate representation of the historical process – as its ‘natural mode of being’, in Woolf’s (2006) words.

Through this identification of the process of nation/state formation with history itself (that is the fusion of ethnic nationalism and historicism), national historians could also see their histories as ‘truthful’ and/or as ‘objective’. Therefore, the discourse of ‘objective’ history and the discourse of the nation/state were intimately connected from the second half of the nineteenth century: striving after ‘objectivity’ was conceived as leaving ‘partisanship’ behind in
terms of religious and political affiliations within the national arena. This connection explains why most historians regarded ‘the’ point of view of ‘the nation/state’ as the ‘objective’ point of view and why they did not experience a tension between their striving after ‘objectivity’ and their role as ‘half-priests and half-soldiers’ of their nation.

As to the future perspectives of national history are concerned: as long as nation-states will remain the dominant political framework – and the recent financial crisis has shown that the nation-state still is the primary political framework, also within the EU – I expect national history to thrive as a genre. As long as politics is primarily framed on the national level, political elites will continue to seek legitimacy in terms of national histories. Both the postcolonial and the multicultural condition of much of Europe have changed little in this respect, I think.

Tamm: To escape the national bias, you have been yourself very active in promoting comparative history, and in your own case, especially comparative historiography, i.e. comparative history of history. You argue that for a historian there is no way to avoid comparative method: ‘The only choice historians are facing is that of being explicit about their comparative judgements in epistemic and political matters, or to leave them implicit’ (Lorenz 2010a, 53; see also Lorenz 1999a, 2004b). The comparative method in history has had its advocates since at least early twentieth century, how would you sum up your epistemological stance?

Lorenz: Your observation that I have been advocating comparative perspectives and methods in both history and in historiography is quite to the point. I also did this in a recent contribution to the Holocaust-debate – which is of course known for its explicit claims to ‘singularity’ (Lorenz 2013). As I argued above, all judgements on the representational adequacy or quality are necessarily comparative. Therefore, there is no possibility to escape our comparative predicament in history. Maybe I can illustrate my argument best by providing an example I have elaborated elsewhere concerning the histories of Germany and of Quebec (Lorenz 2010a).

When we address the historiography of Quebec and Germany – two relatively unconnected and therefore well comparable cases – we are addressing both inter-representational and inter-national comparison. In order to establish what is particular and what is similar in national histories, the comparison has to work on the level of the various representations of the same nation and at the level of the representations of other nations.

One similar characteristic of the historiographies of Quebec and of Germany, that leap to the eye of the beholder, is that in both national historiographies there is a similar strong national sense of particularity – or Sonderweg in German. In both cases, this sense of particularity is related to an experience of catastrophe in national history. In the German case losing the Second World War – and as a consequence losing political autonomy and statehood – was represented as the
catastrophe. In the Quebec case losing the Seven Years War – and ‘political autonomy’ as a French entity was represented as the catastrophe.

However, in both cases next to this ‘discourse of difference’ another discourse developed after 1945 in which the essential ‘normality’ of the Quebec and (West-) German society were emphasized. This type of national narratives of ‘normality’ was related to a historical consciousness of being ‘modern’ and (western) ‘democratic’ – and thus as ‘beyond catastrophe’. I have tried to show that both the ‘normality’ and the ‘particularity’ of the national histories of Quebec and Germany are the product of ‘the politics of comparison’ that historians use, that is the implicit and explicit ‘contrast-cases’ involved in both a spatial and a temporal sense.

We can only understand national histories by paying attention to the diverse ways in which such histories have been framed in different narratives, including both the temporal and the spatial frames of reference that are implicitly chosen by the historian. Any understanding of both national history and of national historiography involves such double comparisons, and the historian has the choice only to be explicit or implicit in his/her foregrounding of such comparisons.

I have argued too that the relationship between present, past and future is differently constructed by the discourse of difference and the discourse of normality. Where the discourse of difference emphasizes particular – identity-forming – events in the past and their ‘future potential’, the discourse of normality emphasizes the present and conceives of the future as a continuation of the present.

So the three temporal modes – present, past and future – are invested with different values, as Hartog (2003) already suggested. In my Bochum research project I will continue this line of research by analysing how contemporary historians in Germany and the USA construct temporal differences in the histories they write and how they argue and discuss them – if at all, of course.

**Tamm:** You mentioned in your answers some ongoing projects, including a research project at the Ruhr University in Bochum about the politics of historical time in contemporary historical practice. Would you like to comment briefly on this and any other project you have in mind? And more generally, in what direction is your research currently moving?

**Lorenz:** Contemporary history appears to be a specifically promising field to study notions of time because this domain has been characterized by a problematic past–present relationship from its (remarkably late) institutional start. Because the national varieties of contemporary history have all shown remarkable characteristics of their own, I will focus on two national cases – Germany and the USA – in order to flesh out differences, similarities and transfers. Thus, I hope that the project will provide an empirical basis for a *histoire croisée* in historiography.

I aim to clarify how a number of leading contemporary historians in Germany and the USA go about in differentiating pasts from presents and futures in a set of
clearly spatially and temporarily delimited historiographical case studies. I will deal with the period 1970–present, meaning that books are only included in the analysis when they also deal with the period after 1970. Basically, therefore, I will be focusing on publications concerning the newest or the most present part(s) of contemporary history, that is: those (shifting) parts of the past that are chronologically closest to the (shifting) present. The idea of analysing the newest contemporary history – while consciously ignoring classical contemporary history – is that the newest period is not yet ‘closed off’ by a rupturing break in time according to the historicist argument. This is the borderline where, as it were, we can observe the fissures between the present and the past and thus ‘the past in the making’.

The focus on the newest contemporary history alias ‘the history of the present’ in this project is of both fundamental historiographical and theoretical interest because many historians have argued that writing the ‘history of the present’ is highly problematic, if not outright impossible. Nevertheless histories of the present are being written on a constant basis.

The aims of my project in Bochum are threefold.

The first objective of the project aims to develop an in-depth analysis of how contemporary historians are breaking up time in practice – that is, in their publications on contemporary history – and of how they are developing ‘multiple temporalities’ in historical practice. The analytical tools deployed here are the four kinds of present–past distinctions developed by the philosopher Preston King (2000).

The second objective is to develop an in-depth analysis of the ways in which contemporary historians reflectively discuss how they are breaking up time. This is done by analysing four debates within the historical discipline on recent ruptures and turning points in a comparative manner. The comparative analysis of the discussions of historians concerning the question whether events represent breaking points or ruptures in time – and the arguments used to back up or criticize these claims – will also shed light on how historians argue for discontinuity and continuity. I think such an analysis of breaking points in time is interesting not only from an epistemological point of view, but also from a political one.

Next to the comparison of the several debates about ruptures in time among each other, I want to compare the debates in national political contexts in order to establish how far the nation still matters to contemporary history in general and to temporal differentiations in particular. This question is on the research agenda because until now contemporary history has been intimately connected to the framework of the nation-state (see Nützenadel and Schieder 2004; ‘Zeitgeschichte heute’ 2004). The question is whether this has changed since the European integration and globalization took on momentum. Especially the processes of European integration and of globalization were and are associated with ‘the rise of super-territoriality’ (Scholte) and with ‘time–space compression’ (Harvey) that are supposed by many to make (national) space
increasingly irrelevant. In my earlier historiographical research I have seen little evidence that supported this view, by the way.

The third and last objective of my project is to make both a theoretical and an empirical contribution to the long-standing discussions on the relationship between contemporary history as a discipline to the social sciences and to other non-academic forms of engaging the past (memorial, journalistic, public and reconcilational) (see Assmann 2006; “At the Crossroads” 2011; Graf and Priemel 2011; Patel 2011). Usually historians claim some kind of reflective distance to their object of analysis as their ‘surplus value’ vis-à-vis other disciplines and non-disciplinary ways of dealing with the past, although in the case of contemporary history distance cannot be interpreted in a temporal sense. Therefore, the claim that contemporary historians produce more reliable and more adequate representations of the present than their competitors is lacking a priori plausibility.

This third part of my project also pursues the discussion about the disciplinary identity of contemporary history by analysing central concepts used by contemporary historians to characterize the present – for instance, by the concept of democratization or democracy. Although Koselleck posits that all political and social concepts have an internal temporal structure, directed at the present, past and future at the same time, the specific ways in which these concepts are being used by contemporary historians have not yet been analysed.

Nevertheless, there are very good reasons to do so, starting from the paradoxical observation that it is fairly obvious that most concepts in use for analysing contemporary history have been coined by other disciplines than history. This holds for concepts from ‘modernization’ and ‘modernity’ in all varieties (‘second’, ‘reflexive’, ‘fluid’, ‘multiple’, ‘post’ or ‘high’) over ‘capitalistic’ in various modalities (‘organized’, ‘state’, ‘late’, ‘financial’, ‘neoliberal’, ‘digital’ or ‘global’) to ‘post-ideological’, ‘post-industrial’, ‘consumerist’, ‘technocratic’, ‘risky’, ‘postcolonial’ and ‘post-democratic’ (see Raphael 2012). Social scientists appear to have been far more successful in introducing ‘post’-stamps for the present than historians, even though ‘post’ is the most basic temporal marker of all. The same argument holds for the prefix ‘neo’, like in ‘neoconservatism’, ‘neoliberalism’ and ‘neocommunism’ (or ‘New Labour’). These remarkable facts ask for an explanation – and it may be the circumstance that many contemporary historians do not conceive of constructing the past also in terms of performative acts of their own making. Anyway, that is the direction in which I will be looking for answers and I hope to find them in due time.

Notes

1. I explained this in the introductions to the Chinese and the Spanish versions of my selected essays entitled Bordercrossings: Explorations between Philosophy and History. This book was first published in Polish (Lorenz 2009a). It will also be published in 2014 in Chinese (with Peking UP) and in Spanish (with Promoteo). A discussion on this book will be published in the spring 2014 issue of the e-journal Historein.
2. One could argue that *Sublime Historical Experience* (Ankersmit 2005) is the only book that was not ‘foreseen’ by Ankersmit in 1983.

3. In his latest book *Meaning, Truth, and Reference in Historical Representation* (Ankersmit 2012, 89–91), Ankersmit has at last made explicit that he rejects Quine holism concerning indeterminacy for natural languages although he accepts it for scientific languages. Nevertheless, as before, he basically *posits* that natural languages are fundamentally different from scientific languages in respect to their ‘holism’ without providing convincing arguments. Cf. Ankersmit’s ‘concession’ in footnote 17 (Ankersmit 2012, 78), where he states: ‘I do not want to rule out the possibility that under certain circumstances what is normal in art (and history) may also occur in the sciences’, and where he acknowledges with Kuhn that during ‘scientific revolutions’, ‘scientific notational systems suddenly lose their customary self-evidence and temporarily become more important than truth’.

4. Fermandois argues that whoever describes humans as ‘wolves’ is simultaneously generating anxieties just as someone who describes poverty as a ‘crime’ is raising the normative question of responsibility for poverty. These are non-propositional aspects and functions of metaphors that are as essential as their propositional ones.

5. Historically this change corresponds with Wittgenstein’s change from his *Tractatus* to his *Philosophical Investigations*.

6. For the discussion about White, see Paul (2011). According to Paul, White subscribes to a ‘limited relativism’ (Paul 2011, 95–99). I would argue that this still represents relativism.

7. I have elaborated Bourdieu’s theory of ‘scientific fields’ in Lorenz (2005).

8. Therefore, contemporary historians with historicist leanings tend to subdivide contemporary history in two parts: a ‘closed’ part – preceding the last rupture (= ‘Zeitgeschichte’) – and an ‘open’ part, succeeding the last rupture (= ‘Gegenwartsgeschichte’ or ‘neueste Zeitgeschichte’). See Sabrow (2010) and Schwartz (2003).

9. As many historians in the UK and in Germany conceive of twentieth-century history of Europe basically as ‘the advance of democracy’, this is not an arbitrary example.

10. For instance, Jan-Werner Müller’s (2011) interesting study analyses how democracy was conceived of by political thinkers but not how contemporary historians have used this idea.

Notes on contributors

Chris Lorenz is Professor of German Historical Culture at VU University Amsterdam/Duitsland Instituut Amsterdam. Between 1989 and 2004, he was also Professor of Philosophy of History at Leiden University. Since September 2013, he is Marie Curie/Gerda Henkel Senior Research Fellow at the Ruhr University Bochum. Visiting professorships and research fellowships in Bielefeld (1996), Berlin (1997; 2007), Graz (1999), Erfurt (2000), Stellenbosch (2003), Ann Arbor (2005) and Freiburg (2009–2010). In 1996, he won an Alexander von Humboldt Research prize for his work in the humanities. His research themes comprise modern historiography, philosophy of history and higher educational policies.

Marek Tamm is an Associate Professor of Cultural History at the Estonian Institute of Humanities and a Senior Researcher in Medieval Studies at the Institute of History, both at Tallinn University, Estonia. He has published articles on the medieval history, memory studies and historical theory in various anthologies and in journals, including *History Compass, Journal of Baltic Studies, Journal of Medieval History* and *Nationalities Papers*. His primary research fields are cultural history of medieval Europe, theory of history and memory studies.
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